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US presidential approval of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funding 
has been the subject of much research that largely has been inconclusive or contradictory 
as it relates to whether funds may have been distributed in a biased way through the use 
of presidential discretionary power. The purpose of this study was to explore if or to what 
degree US presidents acted in a potentially biased manner with the approval of FEMA 
assistance during election years in election battleground states between1996-2012. The 
theoretical constructs for this study were group justification bias and social identity 
theory. Study data were obtained through freedom of information requests from FEMA 
for access to every gubernatorial request for FEMA aid from 1995-2012, resulting in 
1,137 records. Data were measured as binomial variables, other than governor’s party 
which included 3 nominal variables. Data were analyzed using frequency distribution 
tables  and  chi-square  tests  of  association  for  political  affiliation  of  the  president, 
governor, and a categorization of battle ground states during election years. A key finding 
illuminated an association between presidential party affiliation and public assistance (p 
= .005), a type of FEMA aid. The study did not, however, indicate any statistical 
association between the award of FEMA hazard mitigation funding and presidential bias. 
The positive social change implication stemming from this study includes information to 
policy makers regarding how FEMA aid is granted, which could assist in an evaluation of 
the FEMA aid process and approval in the future. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
 
It is not known by researchers if presidents acted in a potentially biased manner 
with the use of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approvals during 
election years in election battleground states and/or if there was ingroup favoritism from 
1996-2012 within those same states and times. It is also unknown if the type of aid 
approval from Hazard Mitigation (HM), Public Assistance (PA) and Individual Aid (IA) 
also played an important factor in those decisions. 
Public policy from an academic level is often looked at from solely an 
administrative perspective, ignoring the impact of politics. Public policy in the United 
States, especially at the national level, must take politics into consideration and cannot be 
divorced from its impact on legislation and subsequent policy implications (Stanford, 
2015). Political parties exert real power over the lives of those they represent through the 
policies which they legislate and the manner in which they act. In the United States, 
national politics is largely controlled by one of two parties, the Democratic or Republican 
Party. Though all elected officials are able to govern within the scope of the office they 
hold, each party’s political priorities or philosophies often dictate what they will or will 
not do (Kirkland, Gray, & Lowrey, 2010). During times of national disaster, there could be 
a difference in financial focus each party places on a given region of the country both 
during and after a disaster is declared out of political motivations through the exercise of 
presidential discretionary powers. Salkwoke and Chakraborty (2009) demonstrated that 
presidential emergency declarations do change during election years and that politics play 
a role in disaster relief. Salkowe and Chakraborty also stated that when looking at data 
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through 2003, the political party affiliation of those in governing power had no effect on 
presidential disaster declarations. 
The purpose of inquiry in this study was to explore whether past and current 
presidents acted with bias in the presidential discretionary allocation of FEMA funds in 
1996, 2004 and 2012 in contested electoral election battleground states. Current 
researchers have not adequately explored whether such bias was present. Prior 
researchers did not separate the request and approval/turndown process by category, from 
HM, PA and IA each of which can be individually approved or turned down. Previous 
researchers did not look for correlating data in election battleground states versus the 
nation at large, areas with the most potential for bias by a sitting president in a reelection 
year with the use of discretionary powers. 
Since presidential elections are waged in the swing states where neither candidate 
has a certain electoral lock, knowing the influence FEMA declarations have in these states 
during reelection years became imperative in studying the potential for bias. Previous 
researchers have looked at longitudinal data as far back as the 1950s in regards to FEMA 
dispensation (Sylves & Buzas, 2007); but, in each case, the researchers have only looked 
at full year data compared to other full year data. They failed to focus upon places/times 
that could have the greatest impact on the sitting president with the theoretical construct 
that approvals/turndowns taken by that president for personal gain (Group Justification 
Bias, 2004 p.12) could occur under these conditions at a more frequent rate. 
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Looking at data pre 1993 and trying to compare it to post FEMA cabinet level 
position and subsequent recommendations plus the technological advancement in real 
time reporting of incidents would lead to data with too many variables to compare 
accurately. Swing state focus by modern presidential campaigns has placed an additional 
variable that pre 1993 data would fail to address. It was for these reasons that data on 
approvals and turndowns was isolated to the Internet age, post cabinet level authority 
(Salkwoke et al., 2009). No previous researcher has used this approach through 2012 full 
year data coupled with recursive choice sociopsychological preferences within the 
defined data set. 
In the wake of cases such as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
(2010), understanding money’s impact through political contributions, especially tax 
payer funded programs on national elections is imperative. If there was absence of bias, 
having this knowledge could begin to repair some of the lack of trust people have in 
government (Richey, 2010). Yet if bias was potentially present, having such knowledge 
may prompt citizens to put legislators and executives into office who can safeguard 
FEMA funds from being used for a single party’s gain. 
Throughout history, public officials have risen to the occasion of their office, doing 
outstanding things for the American public, from leadership in the face of adversity to 
legislating social programs for the underserved. Several examples exist in U.S. history to 
draw from, the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the emancipation of the slaves 
during the Civil War and the creation of social safety nets such as Medicare and 
Medicaid for the elderly and impoverished (Clark, 1991). However, many public officials 
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have breached the social trust by committing ethical violations or even worked against 
the legislation previously mentioned. Examples include extra marital affairs of 
Congressman and Senators, calling into question their moral judgment, to bribery of a 
governor for appointment to a vacated Senate seat (Greene, 2012). Yet more insidious 
than such overt acts may be the bias that one person or party has in deciding who and 
what get public funding and attention. Citizens who experience the inadequacies of the 
government may feel that the resulting actions due to political bias when their needs are 
overlooked in favor of another, thus creating political disenfranchisement. 
When political disenfranchisement occurs, citizens may fail to engage in the debate 
on issues that affect them. Through inaction, disengaged citizens abdicate their rights to 
politicians who are then free to enact policies that could favor politically elected officials 
over their duty to their constituents’ well-being (Vig, 1996). However, when corruption by 
a politician is brought to light, voter turnout often increases in order to right the wrongs 
(Escaleras, Calcagno, & Shughart, 2008). 
While the FEMA disaster relief process involves many people and steps from 
inception to execution, the decision to approve or turndown rests in the hands of one 
elected person, that of the president. For anyone to deny that the president is the party’s 
leader while he/she is in office and that sitting presidents are politically motivated would 
be to deny the true power of the Presidency and the individuals who hold that office (Moe 
& Wilson, 1994). It is this singular discretionary power that the Presidency wields with 
regard to FEMA dispensation; one which has been alleged to have political ramifications 
that brings the parallel into being (McCarthy, 2011). The president has many 
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discretionary powers, such as the ability to mobilize the troops and pardon criminals 
(Crocker, 2011). The power the president can wield with the discretionary use of FEMA 
funds is evident with the money he is able to release into a given district (Garrett & 
Sobel, 2003). 
In the democracy in the United States, public policy is shaped by the individuals 
the people elect to office, and these policies have direct impact on the lives of those who 
vote, or chose not to vote, those officials into office. Public policy decisions in the United 
States at the federal level are often the political machinations of a party ideology that 
drives emotional support yet lack evidenced-based decision making on the basis of 
scientific evidence, historical precedence, rational economic choice or equality in citizen 
support spending (Hoover & Pecurino, 2007). Recent political ramifications on fiscal 
policy have occurred as a result of raising the debt limit without increasing revenues on 
the United States credit rating demonstrate a current example of how policy has been 
shaped by political actions (Brandimarte & Lee, 2011). 
When Standard & Poor’s lowered the nation’s previous perfect AAA rating to 
AA-plus in August of 2011, thus raising the interest rate on borrowing for millions, its 
managing director stated that the reason for the lowering the rating was due to political 
gridlock preventing the nation from addressing its debt and deficit problems 
(Brandimarte & Lee, 2011). The gridlock was a result of persons voting, or failing to 
vote, individuals into office who could work across party lines to raise income and cut 
spending or to raise the debt limit as a standalone vote and work on debt and deficit 
reduction as a separate issue (Brandimarte & Lee, 2011). Brandimarte & Lee (2011) 
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noted that while elected officials are put into office under the best of intentions, 
unprepared individuals or those acting out of self-bias can do a disservice to their 
constituents’ needs. The debate which lasted weeks, caused market uncertainty as the full 
faith and credit of the United States was put in jeopardy without a debt ceiling change or 
a drastic cut in immediate spending (Brandimarte & Lee, 2011). It becomes imperative 
for people to know who they are voting into office as well as the policies they intend to 
pursue, as these choices will have direct ramifications on their lives for years to come as 
the above example has clearly demonstrated. 
One of the best ways to know how a person will vote or what policies they will 
pursue, in the absence of previous voting records, is the party they have aligned 
themselves with (Ethridge & Handelman, 2015) . In the contemporary landscape of 
American politics two major political parties hold sway over the majority of national 
issues, that of the Democratic Party and that of the Republican Party (United States 
Senate, 2015). At the pinnacle of party power is the Office of the Presidency, especially 
when it comes to the administration of FEMA funds (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009). Yet under federalism principles, the president is not alone 
with disaster relief duties, for that also falls on each state governor to prepare, prevent 




The interaction between the governor of each state, the president and FEMA 
during times of natural disasters is both an urgent one, and one that could be politically 
charged for personal and party gain. Despite the interplay between the two, it is the 
6  
 
president’s sole discretionary power that decides FEMA fund dispensation, intervention 
and support (Sylves, 2010). The subject of investigation remains timely for understanding 
if bias is present within a political organization can alter the voting actions of the public 
at large or can sway congress into action to take measures to limit potential bias in the 
future through the enactment of new federal laws. 
Chapter 1 is a description of the research problem, research questions, and 
intended study goals. In addition, social implications are documented as well as the 
limitations to the scope of the research and concept definitions. The literature reviewed 
for this research comes from a variety of sources, including peer reviewed primary source 
materials, secondary databases compiled by the United States government, Supreme 
Court cases and periodicals of the day, including those in print and those in electronic 
media. 
Statement of the Problem 
 
The public policy problem that led to this study was the lack of knowledge the 
public and legislators have on the motives of presidents during their disaster declaration 
processes, especially during election years. While knowing the internal motivations of 
any president would be impossible, their decisions can be examined for potential self- 
serving interests. This can be done through quantitatively structured research questions, 
rather than qualitative questioning from presidents and principal agents, who may be 
reluctant to state the truth out of a desire to protect their images for posterity. It is 
possible that presidents have used the FEMA declaration process, one of their 
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discretionary powers, to enhance their own political interests specifically during their 
reelection years in election battleground states. 
Background of the Problem 
 
Few organizations have the ability to touch the lives of all Americans; but, those 
that do hold an implied public mandate to wield that power in a responsible manner 
benefitting the people as a whole (Canady, 1999). Some of those organizations, such as 
FEMA, hold an extra role that speaks to the weight of the power they possess, and that is 
in the ability to save lives and rebuild communities. During times of mismanagement, 
both may be sacrificed (Rowan, 2006). 
From 1992 until 2012, three presidents sat in office and decided which States 
would receive federal aid, to what extent the federal government would lend that aid, and 
which States would receive no aid at all. Those presidents were the heads of national 
political parties and each rendered aid during their terms in office. Each president served, 
or was elected to serve, two consecutive terms. This has offered an historical opportunity 
to review the political policies of both parties in a time of technological similarities, 
during reelection years, through the actions of the president as the final authorizing 
authority, in regards to the use of FEMA funds and observe if bias may have been 
indicated. By researching this now and publishing the findings before the next national 
election is conducted in 2016, would inform the voting electorate as to the importance of 
discretionary powers when selecting a candidate. In the absence of bias this too could 
reaffirm the faith in the current system and allow legislators and academic the ability to 
focus on other areas of study and policy. 
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Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore if, or to what degree political bias may 
have been present in 1996, 2004 and 2012, with the use of FEMA funds by the incumbent 
administration in relation to approvals and disaster declarations, specifically in election 
battleground states. The years 1996, 2004 and 2012 were reelection years for three separate 
presidents, two Democratic and one Republican president party member. The years 
occurred in succession with similar technologies available for real time reporting. 
The years also were ones in which the presidents had control of FEMA and 
actively sought a reelection to office in which they won. The goal was to see whether 
political bias was present in a between subject longitudinal design in order to inform the 
public of potential misuse of federal emergency management funds and/or to inform the 
public of the potential of bias surrounding a discretionary power of the president. During 
a time when the nation is in record debt, knowing where and why funds are being spent is 
imperative to a more appropriate use of federal funds. The study provided information 
that could lead to a better understanding of the presidential discretionary disaster 
declaration process and the understanding of money’s impact in elections especially as it 
relates to such decisions in election battleground States during election years. 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Group Justification Bias 
 
Bias can also be called favoritism in the realm of politics. I drew upon 
assumptions from two different social theories. Favoritism follows a modified 
systems/group justification theory that can be comprised of three different assumptions. 
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Jost, Banji and Nosek (2004) noted some assumptions that apply to group justification 
bias. Similar others are preferred to dissimilar others. (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Brewer, 
1979; Tsui, Egan, & O’Reilly, 1992). Political ideology mirrors/group membership 
individual and collective self-interest and/or social position. (Centers, 1949; Downs, 
1957; Olson, 1971; Sidanius, Singh, Hetts, & Federico, 2000). 
 
Social Identity  Theory 
 
Drawing from social identity theory one is able to see that there is a propensity to 
favor those of similar traits in regard to social stereotyping, performance evaluation and 
resource allocation (Mullen, Brown & Smith, 1992; Ruben & Hewstone, 2004; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986;). Ingroup bias is an associative psychological and social behavior. It is the 
favoring of one group over another, party ideology for self-interest and the allocation of 
resources to ones ingroup that begged the question if sitting presidents also succumbed to 
these biases with the use of public disaster relief funds. Social identity theory and group 
justification bias both form the basis for a president’s decision making process, especially 
with discretionary powers during times that offer potential gains for self and/or party 
through the allocation of resources. Prior disaster research has yielded conflicting results, 
partially due to what was and was not studied yet this disparity further highlights the need 
to incorporate a sociopsychological overlay to the questions asked. 
Garret and Sobel (2003) suggested that politics was the driving factor in over half 
of all disaster declarations suggesting that ingroup bias was present. Gaspar and Reeves 
(2011) noted that when a president denies a FEMA relief request they are hurt at the polls 
while the requesting governor is rewarded, further placing more pressure on the president 
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to approve requests out of self-interest, thus increasing the potential for bias. Gasper 
(2013) noted from 1992 through 2005 that presidential election years play a role on the 
turndown and approval process. Emergency managers have asserted that there are 
significant political factors in play when a disaster occurs during an election year (Selves, 
n.d.). Salkowe and Chakraborty (2009) found little association between party affiliation 
of the governor and that of the president in determining such decisions based on at data 
through 2004 in the aggregate. It should be noted that they did not break down the 
presidential election years within election battleground States to know if this held true for 
all election areas periods. 
Husted and Nickerson (2014) asserted that after holding for flood damage, a 
state’s ability to recover after the flood, that incumbents political economic choice to 
approve or deny has been influenced by their political party, the party of the governor in 
relation to the president and the number of electoral votes that the state grants directly 
refuting Salkowes and Chakrborty’s (2009) data and supporting recursive choice. In each 
case the authors have looked at data going back to 1969 through 2005. They have not 
held for changes in FEMA organization, technological changes and response time, or 
differentiated between election, nonelection and election battleground state. They 
furthermore did not look at all FEMA request for aid, noting that in Husted and 
Nickerson’s analysis flood damage was focused on and a determination on a State’s 
ability to recover were inserted factors. 
Silves (2010) asserted that governor requests for large scale events that occur on a 
rapid basis are decided more by administrative processes than out of the political benefit. 
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In addition, Reeves (2011) determined that post enactment of the Stafford Act the 
electoral competitiveness of a state influences whether or not the state gets FEMA aid. 
This is where the theoretical construct comes into play. I theorized that a president 
could 
1. Act in a manner that favors self-interest with FEMA dispensation. 
 
2. Allocate resources to favor his or her collective (party) interests. 
 
3. Be notable during times when his discretionary powers would favor self 
 
(reelection years in election battleground states). 
 
The theoretical construct was founded in the belief that psychological and social 
factors of group justification bias, social identity, political economy and recursive choice 
theories play an active role in the approval and turndown decision making process of a 
sitting president. Since presidential discretionary powers are subjective by law, to assume 
that these constructs play little role in the outcome of a FEMA gubernatorial request 
would be to deny the power of political economy by the most powerful leader in the free 
world. This was where bias and potential corruption were drawn into the study. 
Determining Bias 
 
In order to determine if bias was present, a baseline in the comparative data sets 
had to be set prior to data gathering and evaluation in order to limit researcher bias 
playing a role in the subsequent data analysis. Since partial correlation analysis and 
multiple regression analysis of quantitative data to determine differences between 
longitudinal data sets was demonstrated by Glants, Abrmowitz, and Burkart (1976) work 
looking at monies effect on victory margins, similar analysis can be conducted to answer 
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the research questions and compare mean differences between administrations and within 
in order to help determine bias with the use of FEMA funds. In addition, chi square test 
for fit can be run with the data available to find statistical associations. A significance 
level of .05 between means, while it may show variance, might not alone determine bias 
if the majority of natural disasters occurred in one party’s states in a given year. 
 
To hold for this, I focused on election battleground states during reelection 
election years and compare the results versus other election years as well as uncontested 
states. In order to hold for group justification bias, the party of the requestor and that of 
the president was examined continuing the work previously done through 2005 and to 
bring new criteria as variables, such as election battleground states and potential personal 
political gain. Unlike Husted and Nickerson (2014) who tested using recursive choice, the 
use of multiple chi-square tests for fits analysis enables more factors to be studied, 
though it was possible to arrive at the same conclusion. 
 
Several examples in the literature supported the notion of bias for political gain as 
has been previously mentioned. Chen (2008) found that in Florida in 2004, Republican 
voters were responsive to FEMA aid, while Democratic voters were not. For each $7,000 
spent on FEMA aid one additional vote for Bush resulted. Furthermore, Snyder and 
Levitt (1997) found that $14,000 spent by an incumbent in earmark spending led to one 
corresponding vote for an incumbent congressman. While dated, both gave examples of 




Bias could also be looked at from a corruption point of view. Corruption is the 
misuse of power, either implicit or entrusted, for political gain (Pope, 2000). Colombatto 
(2003) used the example of a public official using his/her power for their individual 
personal advantage at the expense of the general well-being of the public. This would be 
the case if presidents acted upon their own bias with the approval process of FEMA funds 
during election years in election battleground states. This was also the most relevant part 
as personal gain or gain for one’s ingroup was at the core of this study. Corrupt practices 
have a negative effect on income and growth (Kaufmann, 1997). 
Corruption does not necessarily mean any action that breaks the law. Examples of 
legal corruption in the United States exists when a legislative body votes for their own pay 
raise rather than using an outside body to determine that raise, judges deciding on cases 
where they have a self-interest, or when lobbying by the private sector allows passage of 
particular legislation (Kaufmann & Vicente, 2005). While those corrupt actions may not 
break the law, society at large often frowns on such practices and wishes to curb them. As 
its core, corruption unbalances democratic fairness by altering public 
service allocation. This latter effect often results in changes in elected officials or passage 
of legislation to curb the temptation and limit such practices (Chang, 2013). While 
corruption may be a strong word to some, by the above definition, actions for political 
gain fit and it was through this lens that the study was conducted. 
Bias manifests itself either explicitly or implicitly (Casey, Warren, Cheesman, & 
Elek, 2012). While the actions of some bias might reflect the beliefs and attitudes of 
some through conscious thought others bias might manifest on a level below active 
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consciousness derived from experiences over time and often a product of one’s social 
learning (Greenwald & Banji, 1995). The difficulty with looking at implicit bias in the 
case of potential presidential allocation of resources for personal gain is that all testing 
methods for measuring implicit bias to date involve lab tests in real time; this includes 
computerized measures, paper and pencil measures and physiological measurements 
(Casey et al., 2012). While implicit bias could have manifested, if bias was determined, 
knowing if the actions were either implicit or explicit bias cannot be known from the 
historical data alone. This does not rule out the ability to determine if bias was present for 
a bias is a departure from some point that has been marked as neutral (Kang, 2009). 
Bias can also be called specific bias if the deciding body has an interest in the 
case before him or general bias such as prejudice (Vendel, 2005). Vendel wrote that 
determining bias can be done statistically or using other systematic manner through the 
examination of multiple decisions. It was therefore imperative that a thorough 
examination of the data be done to determine if there was a variance from a neutral point 
over multiple decisions. In the case of this data, the neutral point was deemed as the mean 
of all requests decided and would be compared as the potential political economy of the 
president increased, from general election year, reelection year and battleground state 
during a reelection year. The US Supreme court has accepted statistical proof if the 
pattern appears to be stark as the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the 
 
Constitution (U.S. Supreme Court, 1987). 
 
Labeling bias is often a judgment call done through the lens of a reasonable 
person. Two sections of the Judicial Code in the United States address the subject of bias 
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or prejudice of a judge (United States Code 28, 2009 and 2015). These are not rulings after 
the case, but rather when a judge recuses himself/herself from presiding over a case 
because he/she might have the appearance of impartiality by a reasonable person. This 
includes when a judge has a financial interest in the outcome, or has expressed an opinion 
on the matter in the past. Even the multiple state legislatures have policies that allow a 
representative to withhold a vote if he/she has a potential personal financial interest 
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015). Flamm (2015) noted that, “bias is not 
an empirically provable fact but rather a way of characterizing an attitude or state of mind” 
(p. 2). This is because of no legal established percent of what constitutes a biased decision 
from an unbiased decision based on an absence of external and internal factors and reliant 
only on the mean of the decisions alone. Proving a biased position is about convincing a 
reasonable personal that there might be potential for the decision to be rendered to be one 
of a non-neutral position. Bias remains a propensity for or against one person or group 
(Oxford, 2012) and can be viewed most readily during times involving ethical choices, 
like the FEMA approval process. 
When coupled with longitudinal studies over three administrations during 
reelection presidential years using system justification, recursive choice and social 
identify theories, bias should be able to be determined by focusing on both ingroup 
(presiding president’s party) and self-serving (election battleground states) favoritism 
based on statistical tests of historical data and the discretionary approval/turndown of 
FEMA disaster requests over multiple decisions. Additionally it was important to note 
that extensive studies have looked at data through 2004, but did not compare election 
17  
 
battleground states to the population nor has any study looked at data through all of 2012 
further breaking down the different types of FEMA aid. 
Definitions of Terms 
 
Approval: The presidential granting of disaster status to the original gubernatorial 
request in part or in full (Sylves, 2010) 
Bias (also known as favoritism): Bias is defined as an inclination, prejudice or 
propensity for or against one person or group (Oxford, 2012). Measured in number of 
gubernatorial requests versus number of presidential FEMA approvals holding political 
party to be the determinate and compared as the potential political economy of the 
president rises from the general election, reelection year to a reelection year in a 
battleground state. 




FEMA Aid: Federal Emergency Management Agency Aid approved by the 
president to help with the requesting state. For the purpose of this study can be in the 
form of Public Assistance (PA), Individual Assistance (IA), or Hazard Mitigation (HM). 
Governor request for aid: The formal process of declaring a state of emergency 
through a request to the Office of the president (Sylves, 2010). 
Gubernatorial party affiliation: The party of the governor is defined as the 
national party that he/she identified with at the time of his/her election. 




Presidential party affiliation: The party of the president is defined as the national 
political party that he identified with at the time of his election, either Democratic or 
Republican. 
Political Economy: An examination of a political decision on the economic policy 
impacts. Involves the use of game theory, law, economics, social systems and political 
ideology. (Harvard University, 2014) 
Propensity: An established pattern of behavior (Merriam-Webster, 2014) In this 
case calls into question the appearance of a pattern of behavior in the absence of an 
established pattern. 
Recursive Choice: In this paper, defined as the president’s positive decision of 
expected utility of a positive outcome to every action, chosen between two options, 
approval or turndown. (Fundenberg, Strzalecki, 2012). 
Swing State (Also known as an election battleground State): A U.S. state where the 
two major political parties have similar levels of support among voters, viewed as 
important in determining the overall result of a presidential election (Oxford, 2013). 
Defined for the purpose of this study as a U.S. state where the margin of victory between 
the top candidates was less than 5%. Listed below are the identified swing states based on 
this definition as was recorded in the national archives Certificates of Ascertainment from 
each State (NARA, 2013). 
• 1996: Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia 
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• 2004: Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
 
Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin 
 
• 2012: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia 
 
 
Turndown: The presidential denial of disaster status to the original gubernatorial 
request in full (Sylves, 2010), or in part. 




I looked at the presidential election years of 1996 through 2012 in order to limit 
the scope of the data to be analyzed and to elicit the data from the most potentially 
ethically challenged moments of each administration in regards to FEMA fund use, 
potential bias and potential political corruption. The research assumption was that all of 
these data were available and accurate and ready for analysis through governmental 
sources and that if potential bias were to occur with the use of FEMA funds it would be 
most evident during presidential reelection years in election battleground states, where 
the incumbent’s discretionary power controls FEMA dispensation. Finally the intervening 
years were compared to understand presidential decision making trends outside of 
election battleground states and outside of election years in order to establish a pattern of 
behavior and a baseline for comparison. 
Scope 
 
The research was focused on 1996, 2004 and 2012 and all natural disasters that 
occurred in the States to which FEMA funds were requested during those years as well as 
the intervening years. Since governmental historical data was available, there was little 
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risk to outside parties in the research collection methodology. Since the scope of the 
research lay in understanding if, and to what extent, bias existed with the allocation of 
FEMA funds, the focus was on party bias and thus the ability of the research to do harm 
does not affect the research gathering methodology nor the data analysis methodology. 
Surveys were not appropriate in any form since the research was not interested in how 
people felt about FEMA or disaster recovery, but rather on the quantitative statistics that 
may have demonstrated potential bias or the lack there of. The data existed as had been 
verified--through a freedom of information request. The entire data set was used, not a 
sample, thus giving a more complete picture. The data set itself had been identified as 
present, accessible and on-hand through direct contact with FEMA representatives in the 
FOIA department of that agency. 
Limitations 
 
I was only able to analyze where publically collected data existed. I did not take 
into account factors such as local or state policies that may have hindered federal aid or 
limited federal involvement after a crisis. I did not look at polls from election years or 
other years that predicted what states would or would not be election battleground states, 
merely at postelection results where the margin of victory was less than 5%. Areas that 
show discrepancy will lead future researchers to gaps in the study that can be further 
explored, and to understand how FEMA's use can either enhance, or hinder local efforts 
to "prevent, relieve or overcome disaster hardship, injury or adverse condition” 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2009). If bias was shown, historical political 
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scientists would be able to better understand the election results of 1996, 2004 and 2012 
with regard to the discretionary power of the president and the use of FEMA funds. 
Delimitations 
 
The scope of this research project was limited as per Creswell’s (2003). The 
delimitations of the study include that personal interviews with each president were not 
conducted to understand their own decision making process, neither were interviews 
conducted with FEMA agents and executives who could shed light on intimate 
conversation made at the time of the approvals or turndowns in each instance. The ability 
to access data was limited to data available through FOIA requests and through published 
governmental data on each disaster request or related third party sites like those of the 
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI). Finally the research does not examine the 
motivations of the individual governors during each of their requests, with an estimated 
3500-3700 disasters handled annually by the States without Federal assistance, there was 
ample opportunity for each governor to likewise act in a biased fashion hoping federal 
funds offset local costs (FEMA (b), 2013). 
Significance of the Study 
 
Reduction  of Gaps 
 
I sought to fill gaps in understanding presidential approval and turndowns both 
after 2005, continuing the work done by Salkowe and Chakraborty and Husted and 
Nickerson, as well as understanding the relationship of presidential FEMA decision 
making in election battleground states during election years versus nonelection years and 
non-election battleground states. I explored the contradictions in previous research 
22  
 
suggesting that party affiliation may or may not play a role in the decision making 
 
process of the president in regards to FEMA approvals or turndowns, something again the 
current published research does not explore after 2005. Lastly the focus of the study on 
election battleground states, discretionary powers, FEMA dispensation, ingroup bias and 
corruption had not been explored in this fashion before. 
Implications  for Social Change 
 
An exploration of how each president has made decisions during times of a 
national disaster in recent history, especially when it comes to the health and welfare of 
United States citizens on sovereign soil can directly impact an individual's decision on 
whether or not to support a specific party, seek to reform it, vote independent or act to 
reform policy. In the light of politician’s power over public policy and public policy's 
effect on each citizen’s life, this is but one more piece of information along with a party's 
political platform, in choosing a path to shape that policy. Every person’s vote counts, but 
knowing how to voice it is paramount to choosing one’s freedom. At the least, 
understanding if bias occurred allows for a more critical dialogue of presidents and their 
discretionary policy effects on contemporary society and whether the ultimate power for 
approvals for FEMA disaster declarations should rest in the hands of a politically elected 
official or should instead be awarded based on specific delineated criteria As has been 
previously noted, discretionary powers have the ability to bias a president’s decisions and 
this can lead to an appearance of corruption. 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
1. Is there a statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA 
aid approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governor 
during times of natural disasters during 1996, 2004 and 2012? 
H10: There is no statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA 
aid approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governors during times of 
natural disasters in 1996, 2004 and 2012. 
H1a: There is a statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA aid 
approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governor during times of natural 
disasters in 1996, 2004 and 2012. 
2. Is there a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals 
depending on the political party of the requesting governor and the party 
of the president and approvals in 1996, 2004 and 2012? 
H20: There is no statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals 
between the political party of the requesting governor and the party of the president 
during 1996, 2004 and 2012. 
H2a: There is a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals between 
the political party of the requesting governor and the party of the president during 1996, 
2004 and 2012. 
 
3. Is there a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals 
depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 
and 2012 compared to requests in the same year? 
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H20: There is no statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals 
depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 and 2012 
compared to requests in the same year. 
H2a: There is a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals 
depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 and 2012 
compared to requests in the same year. 
4. Is potential bias present with regard to the use of FEMA funds by one or 
more presidents during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non-election 
years during that same time period? 
H20: There is no significant bias between the presidents with regard to the 
allocation of the use of FEMA funds during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non- 
election years during that same time period. 
H2a: There is the appearance of bias with one or more presidents with the use of 
FEMA funds during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non-election years during that 
same time period. 
Summary 
 
While bias and corruption are both known to exist in politics, knowing if public 
disaster relief funds are being used to favor one political party or another at the expense 
of another was not known. Since FEMA funding approval and dispensation are largely 
the purview of the Executive branch and the president, the power to do both harm and 
good rests in the decision of one person and his/her ability to remain politically unbiased 
when making funding decisions and disaster relief calls (Lindsay 
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& McCarthy, 2012). Money has played a role in getting people elected as has been 
previously noted (Levitt et. al., 1997). This is ever more the case in a post Citizens United 
v. F.C.C. world. Knowing how one’s party leader has behaved with sensitive and vital 
relief fund dispensation can drastically change voter perception and increase engagement 
especially if that dispensation has been biased by one’s social construct or frame of mind. 
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Administrators and academics alike understand how important public policy is in 
affecting the lives of Americans across this country. What both sometimes fail to 
communicate is how politics affects the shape and direction of public policy and how 
taking action when occupying a politically appointed position can have significant 
effects, both positive and negative, on the public. Those who do understand this may lack 
the necessary resources in order to form a cohesive argument for change. 
The literature review was conducted using Walden Library’s EBSCO Research 
database, SocINDEX, ProQuest, Google Scholar, governmental hosted sites such as 
FEMA.gov and House.gov, numerous open source documents and periodicals and other 
documents from the Unites States Government. Many keywords were used in the various 
searches, including bias, corruption, politics, FEMA, turndown, approval, disaster, in - 
group, favoritism, declaration, governor, president, political economy, recursive choice 
and money. 
This literature review explored various ways in which publically elected officials 
utilize the powers of their office for political gain and what the effects of those actions 
may have been on subsequent elections. Knowing the major causes that lead to corruption 
gave a foundation to understanding potential bias. The research was not meant to be a full 
account of FEMA’s role in society. Other research and books cited within this study go 
into greater depth and are more germane to their topics. Instead this literature review was 
meant to establish a brief framework on how FEMA aid when rendered can influence 
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people’s lives and elections. It further explored FEMA’s role as a political entity that 
appears to influence the voter decision making process. Such resources and citations not 
only set a foundation for this study, but may also offer the necessary resources for 
administrators and academics to elicit change. 
Money and Votes in National Elections 
 
Money has long played a role in U.S. politics. Even in the days of US founding 
fathers, money enabled supporters to take out advertisements in local papers, publish 
pamphlets, and even distribute alcohol at polling booths. Yet, direct evidence of the role 
of money in politics has been tracked more recently. Glants, Abrmowitz, and Burkart 
(1976) identified the distinct role that money played in the 1972 and 1974 California 
State Assembly and Congressional delegation and the 1972 House of Representative 
Elections. Using a partial correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis the authors 
found that the amount of money the challenger spent compared to the monies spent by 
the incumbent decided how large the victory margin would be, usually in the incumbent’s 
favor due to the difference in mean spending. This did not take into account soft monies 
spent, but rather just the monies spent by the candidates themselves. 
Snyder and Levitt (1997) found that $14,000 spent by an incumbent in earmarked 
legislative spending led to one corresponding vote for an incumbent congressman. This 
was one of the first attempts at quantifying a dollar to be set per vote. Their contention 
was that votes could be bought with earmark legislation in an election year. They did not 
look at presidential races or differences between parties. Earmarks, or what is coined as 
pork-barrel spending, are prevalent in many of the bills passed by either house of 
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congress (Shepsle, Van Houweling, Abrams & Hanson (2009). Though this would not be 
looked at as normal campaign expenditures, the link from an incumbent’s power to 
influence the next election has been directly showed (Hiebert, 1998). 
Campaign finance has also been researched on its role in participant’s ability to 
run for office. Hiebert (1998) found that citizens could not participate in running for 
elections equitably without campaign finance laws that limited the amount of monies 
incumbents could generate. Hiebert further demonstrated that unrestricted spending 
influenced elections in Canada and made it too challenging for unequally funded 
challengers to run for office. While focusing on the democracy present in Canada, 
Hiebert highlighted many of the same issues that have plagued the United States, from 
political action committee spending or secondary sponsor monies, earmark spending, to 
primary monies spent by the candidates themselves. In each case monies spent have 
altered the voting outcomes. 
In 1994 Senate races throughout the United States, spending was directly related 
to the amount challengers had to spend and that incumbents not only tended to win more, 
but also outspent their challengers, mimicking the 1976 findings of Glants et al. (1976). 
Gerber (1998) used a least squares estimation with a new tool to hold for candidate 
wealth. Even in doing so repeatedly the incumbent rose more money, spent more money 
and was reelected to office more often. Money, as the defined variable, was the primary 
factor of an incumbent being reelected. 
Jacobson (2006), using the Annaberg studies, found that challengers to senatorial 
races did better the more money they spent in relation to the incumbent. Conversely, 
29  
 
while the incumbent’s polls rose directly with the amount they spent compared to the 
incumbent, the incumbent’s expenditures did not yield a rise in poll numbers related to 
what the challenger spent. This suggests that name recognition or another unmeasured 
factor such as soft money played a role in the election outcomes in addition to the monies 
spent (Whang, 2013). Although money still played a role, it was to a lesser degree than 
had been previously discussed. 
Chen (2008) found that in Florida in 2004, Republican voters were responsive to 
FEMA aid, while Democratic voters were less. For each $7,000 spent on FEMA aid one 
additional vote for President Bush resulted. Her analysis controlled for the strength of the 
hurricane in each area compared to the damages as well as voter registration, election 
results of 2000, 2002 and of 2004. While her analysis looked at Florida and the use of 
funds in that state, she did not indicate if bias was evident on the part of those who 
dispensed FEMA funds. Chen indicated voter preference was related to the amount of 
FEMA dollars spent, which ended up favoring the incumbent remaining consistent with 
previous literature. Chen did not look at the monies the parties spent in their own 
campaigns, just the monies FEMA spent in the State. 
National politicians understand the power of money in politics. Much of their 
time is spent in fundraising campaigns and often the candidate with the most capable or 
most effective fund raising machine gets his/her parties’ endorsement (Pogue, 2011). 
News organizations report on the amount of money each campaign raised and spent in a 
given time period and the evidence of that money can be seen in newsprint, television, 
and Internet advertisements (Scherer, Rebela & Wilson, 2014 ). Money allows campaigns 
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to hire full time staff, establish places of operations, increase travel budgets and fill 
mailboxes with leaflets extolling their candidates’ views while denouncing their opponents 
(Grober, Rueben & Tymula, 2013). Money can play subtle psychological roles too, from 
making people feel better about a candidate/office holder who gives/allows money to enter 
his/her district to bribes for votes such as when Washington would wheel barrels of liquor 
to courthouse lawns and polling places for election day (Pogue, 2011). 
Brief Overview of Federalism and Disaster Relief 
 
Disasters have struck the United States since its founding. In 1776, 4,170 people 
were killed along the eastern seaboard in a storm called the Hurricane of Independence 
(Jones, 2005). No federal mechanism existed at the time to help those in need, and the 
colonies were at war with Great Britain limiting any aid from overseas (Fitzpatrick, 
2005). In 1803, congress passed the Congressional Act of 1803 to give New Hampshire 
residents aid for a town destroyed by fire since both the State and the local residents were 
unable to locally cope with the issue (Blanchard, 2015). The federal government 
remained weak during the 1800s and 1900s through the concept of states' rights and state 
sovereignty, the aforementioned federalism principle. 
Advocates of federalism forced the separate states to rely on their own 
communities for aid during times of crisis (Public Broadcasting Service, 2005). When 
this became too much for those communities to bear they used the only mechanism they 
had to them for relief which involved getting o representatives to lobby their fellow 
congressmen for aid (Public Broadcasting Service, 2005). While Congress continued to 
act on behalf of the several states, reaction was slow and costly in lost lives. For over a 
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century, Congress passed similar relief efforts, but no disaster mechanism on a national 
level existed to render immediate aid to the States and would not exist until the 1930s 
(Public Broadcasting Service, 2005). 
By 1950, Congress had endorsed the idea of federal consistent aid to the several 
states with the passage of the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, which organized coordinated 
federal responses to major disasters (Moss, Schellhamer & Berman, 2009). Expansion of 
this act continued in Congress over the next twenty years through shelter and food aid and 
federal loans and unemployment insurance for those affected by disasters (Public 
Broadcasting Service, 2005). What remained constant since the 1930's was an ever 
increasing US population, a more consistent and persistent media presence that shaped 
congressional action, and the presence of major disasters to remind people of the need for 
swift aid from all sources (Public Broadcasting Service, 2005). Disasters such as the 
Vanport, Oregon flood of 1948 when 20,000 people lost their homes or in New Orleans 
when Hurricane Betsey struck in 1965 flooding the city, remind people that they have 
been inundated with yearly events, though not all have had catastrophic results (Hopper, 
2005). 
 
FEMA was created in 1979 through Executive Order no. 12148 by an enactment of 
executive powers contained within The Disaster Relief Act of 1974, the Earthquakes 
Hazards Reduction Act of 1977, the National Security Act of 1947, the Production Act of 
1950, the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1939 and the Budget and 
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, along with Public Law 92-385 (Carter, 1979). 
FEMA's initial role was to respond to disasters that local and state authorities could not 
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respond to, much as congressional supplemental aid had done in the past. However, FEMA 
was designed not just as a mechanism of funds to be sent to rebuild a community, but also 
as a coordinated federal effort to assist State and local officials mitigate disasters. Such 
mitigation occurred once a governor declared a state of emergency and requested 
aid from the president for FEMA relief (FEMA.gov, 2010). While state budgets continue 
to strain with each passing year, the rate of governor-requested aid to FEMA had not. 
From an average 43 declarations from 1989-1993 to 89 from 1993-2001 to 130 under the 
43rd President Bush, the average per year has climbed (FEMA.gov (d), 2015). 
 
In 1989 and 1992 FEMA was called upon to respond and provide aid during two 
hurricane events in Florida and the Gulf Coast. In both instances, the agency failed to 
provide aid in an efficient manner, leaving many people homeless and without shelter, 
food or water. Many in the media called for aid from military sources to fill in where 
FEMA failed (Rank, 2010). Yet FEMA was created for the very purpose of hurricane and 
earthquake disaster response leaving many to wonder what role the federal government 
should most effectively play in times of real need. According to Rowan (2006), FEMA 
failed to communicate effectively and was hampered by management and lack of authority 
at that time. Over 250,000 people were homeless as a result of hurricane 
Andrew in 1992 and caused over $30 billion in property damage (House.gov, 2007). 
 
In 1993 when President Clinton took office, FEMA was elevated to a cabinet 
 
level position in hopes of amending some of the issues hurricane Andrew had highlighted 
(FEMA.gov, 2010). During the tenure of President Clinton, through congressional 
expansion, the role of FEMA grew to include low cost loans and training to first 
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responders (FEMA.gov, 2010). It was during this time that FEMA developed the nation's 
first coordinated plan for responding to disasters called the Federal Response Plan (FRP, 
House.gov, 2007). 
When the attacks on September 11, 2001 occurred, FEMA was involved in direct 
operations in New York City. Yet even the agency’s own actions during the day of the 
attack and subsequent days following showed opportunities for improvement (GAO, 
2006). In an internal investigation, FEMA's Office of the Inspector General noted that the 
agency should have been more flexible and fair when assisting people with economic 
losses (GAO, 2006). The report cited ineffective assistance to those adversely affected by 
secondary economic traumas (Chen, 2003). Yet congress and the president did nothing to 
amend the cited issues at that time. 
Presidential Discretionary Powers 
 
The president has many discretionary powers at his/her disposal, such as those 
vested in the president by Article II of the U.S. Constitution. The president, acting as 
commander-in-chief can enter into treaties with foreign countries, can appoint judges, 
ambassadors, and other officials. Further powers include the use of executive orders 
through the aggregation of powers asserted under the mandate that all laws be faithfully 
executed, by areas where congress by inaction has left a vacuum, unilateral presidential 
actions and in the issuance of pardons (Chiou & Rothenberg, 2013). 
Presidential Discretionary Power in the FEMA Disaster Process 
 
When a natural disaster occurs in a given state, the initial response is the job of 
the local government’s emergency services. In the case of an event deemed too 
34  
 
catastrophic for local resources to handle the state, in conjunction with federal officials, 
can do a joint damage assessment (Sylves, 2010). If deemed too much for the state to 
handle the governor may request FEMA aid (FEMA.gov (b), 2013). FEMA evaluates and 
then recommends to the president a course of action (FEMA.gov (b), 2013). 
The president then chooses to approve or deny (turndown) that request in part or 
in full and may make modification to it, such as increasing the scope of the declaration, 
or approving hazard mitigation but turning down individual assistance aid (FEMA, 
2013b). The recommendations given by FEMA to the president are covered under 
executive privilege and are not subject to public review (Gasper, 2013). It is this 
discretionary choice that is at the center of this research paper. See Appendix A. Lastly 
Sylves (2010) noted that presidential disaster declarations can be either major 
declarations, emergency declarations or catastrophic declarations, each allots a certain 
dollar threshold if approved, and only the president makes the decision as to what type it 
is if approved. 
Waste Within Disaster Relief Programs and Political Motivations 
 
While not peer-reviewed, newspapers can share a pulse of the public at a given 
time. Such examples include FEMA incidents in Florida in 2004. The Florida Sun- 
Sentinel reported in 2005 that millions of dollars had been awarded to Florida residents 
who did not have any damage from disasters occurring in 2004 (Kestin, O'Matz, Maines, 
& Burnstein, 2005). While this citation shows public interest, scholars likewise admit to 
FEMA’s inadequacies at the time. Perrow wrote that FEMA paid Florida residents in 
excess of $31 million to those that were unaffected by 2004 hurricanes because of the 
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States-key political importance to the Bush administration (Perrow, 2005). While 
accusations of abuses of many governmental programs exist, why was congressional and 
executive oversight apparently lacking when it came to FEMA dispensation? While 
mismanaging of funds was alleged by the media and some in congress, the question 
remained if FEMA was being used in a biased fashion, or if the use of FEMA has 
remained consistent from one party to another. Since bias in policy making and 
implementation can be viewed as corrupt actions, knowing how the public at large has 
reacted to abuses in government spending that might influence elections is pertinent to 
this discussion. 
Political Interest Groups Shaping Policy 
 
Influence can occur from various levels. While some actions in the use of 
discretionary power stem from self-interest, others can be to further the end of another 
entity for a current or future reward to self. Kirkland et al. (2010) noted that during 
campaigns incumbents have a marked advantage. While they focused on PAC funds 
flowing largely to incumbent campaigns, they did not note why incumbents had such 
advantages, only that it was a given. In their study they addressed monies role in PAC 
contributions to campaigns, considered that issue-driven politicking had the sole purpose 
of raising funds for candidates regardless of party platform or policy ideology, and 
explored how PAC monies were given based on policy agendas (Kirkland et al., 2010). 
Issue-driven campaigning forced policy to be crafted that would fulfill campaign pledges, 
not out of initial citizen demand, but rather in a candidates’ reaction to the spending and 
marketing that came from taking a stand on the issue. The media buzz and funds that 
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poured into the coffers made taking a stand on either side of an issue a PAC fund raising 
bonanza. 
The concept of campaign contributions and whether limits to campaign 
contributions mattered are contested as the incumbent benefits from the use of such 
monies and would be at a personal disadvantage to get rid of it (Fuller, 2014). Stratmann 
and Francisco (2006) found that donations were conditional to the level of activity that 
concerned a particular political action committee (PAC) and that such activity often 
dictated the direction of candidates campaign and election chances. They further noted 
that PACs historically donate at a significantly higher rate to incumbent campaigns 
compared to a challenger’s campaign, further increasing the amount of money an 
incumbent has to spend on a race. They also noted that PACs tended to donate more 
money as the public forum of debate increased and became more widely viewed and 
arguments more heated (Stratmann & Francisco, 2006). They further reiterated previous 
research, finding that incumbents had a more prevalent rate of reelection due to monies 
influence on those elections and the incumbent’s ability to outspend a challenger 
(Stratmann et al., 2006). 
Interest group spending can swing policy congruence by up to 18% (Lax & 
Phillips, 2012). The political weight lent by powerful groups in both advocacy and 
spending directly impacts policy adoption or lack of adoption, even when the majority of 
potential voters might differ. This further strengthens the effect political opinion has, as 
expressed through a PAC or other interest group, over swaying votes cast even in the face 
of majority opinion pre-election. 
37  
 
In today’s society, political emphasis and money go hand-in-hand. Over the 
course of the articles listed in this literature review there is a trend between how money 
influences voter decision making and how politics can be shaped by that monies effect 
through policy passage or denial (Levitt et. al., 1997). Since money can alter policy 
through voter manipulation, the question remains if indirect money, such as the money 
spent by the federal government through FEMA aid, likewise alters voter turnout on a 
national scale (Glantz et al., 1976). It must be remembered that FEMA aid to Florida in 
2004 had a direct effect on voter turnout for the incumbent (Chen, 2008). Is such an effect 
indicative of the rest of the states? Have presidents shown bias with the dispensation of 
FEMA funds during reelection years in hopes of influencing election results? The 
importance of answering these questions is not only important to safeguarding 
democracy, but to also insuring that monies that should be spent to those in need are not 
dispensed based on political ideology and reelection desires, but rather on the health and 
safety requirements of all citizens setting politics aside. 
Bias and Corruption in Policy Shaping 
 
Bias can appear in many ways in politics (Hibbing, Smith & Alford, 2014). While 
much of bias is known through one’s political platform, voters have a choice on whom to 
vote into office and who not to elect based on the candidate’s bias or political leanings. In 
a pure democratic way, this reflects the majority will of the people as expressed through 
the policies that one person will enact or legislate upon. Yet there are also times when 
bias is more insidious than the expressed will and needs of the people and this occurs 
when an elected official acts in a way that furthers their own ambitions at the expense of 
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their constituents at large, or when their actions clearly undermine the democratic 
process. 
In recent years, political bias has reared its ugly head on the more insidious side 
through congressional misdeeds that tie directly back to lobbying and the effect money 
has on politics (Thurber, 2011). Members of both houses of congress have been forced to 
resign amidst allegations of bribery, and ethics violations. Numerous convictions have 
likewise risen out of the use of illegal campaign contributions from corporate sponsors, 
and for earmarking legislations for donations (Thurber, 2011). Yet both parties remain at 
fault, the only constant being corruption through monies influence on public officials. 
The actions by members of congress have led to issues with the public’s trust of in 
government and moreover have proved how money can adversely bend politician’s actions 
to favor one viewpoint at the expense of others (Stratmann et al., 2006). While the direct 
actions of each member of congress are not mentioned here in relation to the charges they 
were brought up on, the ramifications of their actions was shown by the 
stern reaction of others in government who sought such convictions on both sides of the 
political aisle. Lobbying in its current form is a direct reflection of money’s influence in 
politics (Lax et al., 2012). This can be in the form of gifts and favors to the new direction 
money can play in advertising and PAC’s. Questions over bribery have not rested solely 
in the actions of congressmen and senators. Questions of undue influence and bias have 
also existed at the presidential and vice presidential level. A recent example includes 
former Vice President Cheney and his ties with Halliburton. As the former CEO of 
Halliburton, questions were raised as to contracts awarded during the Iraq War which 
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skirted around federal regulations (Weeber & Turner, 2007). While the actions of the vice 
president may or may not have been out of direct bias, the implications to policy are drawn 
into question, from the reasons of going to war with Iraq to the reasons for staying after no 
weapons of mass destruction were found (Weeber et al., 2007). 
One of the greatest issues with bias and corruption in government are the after 
effects once exposed that lead to a reduction in generalized trust (Richey, 2010). When 
such trust is reduced, negative societal effects occur, such as a lack of citizen 
involvement in volunteer organizations, reduced voting rates, diminished health and a 
lack of interpersonal communication. In a time of budget crisis when communities are 
left with less money, personal funding to rely on and shrinking public services, reduced 
generalized trust due to corruptive or bias practices can further depress the social 
environment when societal involvement is needed most. 
Discretionary Powers and Corruption 
 
Studies have shown that corruptions’ effects reverberate throughout an economy, 
well beyond the initial action (Brunett, Kisunko, & Welder, 1998). This has included 
economic disparity, a reduction in economic development, decreased entrepreneurial 
investment, and a disproportionate resource allocation (Brunett, et al., 1998). When 
looking at the use of FEMA funds for one’s personal gain, a potential political act by the 
elite (The president) to allocate resources for personal gain as opposed to their principals 
interest, such an act has been called “Grand Corruption” (Jain, 2001). This diversion of 
public spending to areas they deem as greatest to themselves involves the use of a 
discretionary power entrusted by the public in those officials. Yet as Jain mention, this 
40  
 
type of corruption is difficult to identify in the absence of bribes. He further notes that 
this type of corruption may have the greatest consequences on a society (Jain, 2001). 
Other forms of corruption and discretionary powers, which have been touched upon 
earlier in this literature review, include legislative corruption through kickbacks, bribes 
and campaign funding and bureaucratic corruption, such as when an officer of the law 
takes a bribe to avoid giving someone a ticket. One of the most important facets of Jains 
research is his acknowledgement that corruption “requires, above all, that someone have 
discretionary powers over the allocation process“(Jain, pg. 77, 2001). There is no greater 
discretionary power than that of final say, especially in light of necessary funds and 
manpower distribution during a time of a potential crisis (Scheuerman, 2002). Sylves 
(2010) had noted that governmental officials are often rewarded politically if they address 
disasters in a successful manner while those who fail to do so may suffer politically. 
Brief Role of FEMA Changes from 1992-2012 
 
During the tenure of President Clinton through congressional expansion, the role 
of FEMA grew to include low cost loans and training to first responders (FEMA.gov, 
2010). It was during this time that FEMA developed the nation's first coordinated plan for 
responding to disasters called the Federal Response Plan (FRP) (House.gov, 2007). It was 
FEMA and the American Red Cross that provided a mechanism for delivery of resources 
to state and local governments during times of disasters that exceeded the abilities of 
State government to handle without Federal assistance. Those resources could be in the 
form of direct federal manpower, supplies or monies. What is certain is that federal focus 
41  
 
in an area would mean a boost to the local economy and a bonus to the political capital 
from Washington if it was seen to aid the local citizens in their time of need. 
According to the basic plan of the FRP as was republished in 1999, the FRP: 
 
1. Sets forth fundamental policies, planning assumptions, a concept of operations, 
response and recovery actions, and Federal agency responsibilities; 
2. Describes the array of Federal response, recovery, and mitigation resources 
available to augment State and local efforts to save lives; protect public health, 
safety, and property; and aid affected individuals and communities in rebuilding 
after a disaster; 
3. Organizes the types of Federal response assistance that a State is most likely to 
need under 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), each of which has a 
designated primary agency; 
4. Describes the process and methodology for implementing and managing 
 
Federal recovery and mitigation programs and support/technical services; 
 
5. Addresses linkages to other Federal emergency operations plans developed for 
specific incidents; 
6. Provides a focus for interagency and intergovernmental emergency 
preparedness, planning, training, exercising, coordination, and information 
exchange; and 
7. Serves as the foundation for the development of detailed supplemental plans and 
procedures to implement Federal response and recovery activities rapidly and 





In 1996 FEMA was elevated to a cabinet level position in hopes of amending some 
of the issues hurricane Andrew had highlighted within the federal response, such as a lack 
of an immediate on-the-ground support, long bureaucratic lapses of support and delayed 
medical aid (Franklin, 2005). 
Following the World Trade Center attacks on the United States in 2001, FEMA 
was removed from its cabinet position and placed under the new Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). This was done under the DHS Act of 2002 (FEMA (b), 
2013). However issues with expenditures during the 2004 hurricane season in Florida 
coupled with the failure by DHS and FEMA to meet public expectations in the wake of 
Katrina forced congress to pass the DHS Appropriations Act of 2007 which included an 
act to give more power and oversight to FEMA (Govtrack.us, 2010). 
Research on the Role of the Governor and President in Relation to FEMA 
 
When administrative law was set by FEMA as given power by congress, the 
process of an emergency declaration required time prior to action. For example, after a 
governor had consulted with local governmental officials and had decided that the 
recovery was beyond the ability of the State, they could request assistance under the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Relief Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121- 
5206 (FEMA.gov (a), 2010). That request would then be investigated through a 
preliminary damage assessment and impact study. Following the FEMA review, the 
president would then be notified and a suggested course of action could then be taken 
(FEMA.gov (a), 2010). The president could then decide to approve the request for 
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disaster relief, modify it by expanding or contracting the area covered or turndown the 
request. 
Climate Change and FEMA’s Increasing Role 
 
While the frequency of governors to request FEMA aid has risen since its 
inception, so too have the amount of storms increased in both frequency and severity. 
Projections show that cyclones will intensify in their strength as greenhouse gases 
increase in the atmosphere (Knutson, McBcBride, Chan, Emanuel, Holland, Landsea, 
Held, Kossin, Srivastavs & Sugi, 2010). With the rise of more frequent and violent storms 
predicted, FEMA aid was required more as the years pass. It has been asserted by Styles 
(2010) that presidential turndowns do not have a political motivation, but rather 
stem from a lack of administrative clout and that when news media outfits place coverage 
into an event that could be called a disaster but only on a small scale a president might be 
more inclined to approve the governor’s request. In light of this, it becomes even more 
imperative to know if FEMA funds have been used biased fashion to influence an 
incumbent’s chance at reelection, even when the media might not be present. 
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Often doctoral quantitative researchers use samples to understand more about the 
whole. This is done in part due to limitations in expense, time and availability. However, 
in this case, no sample is needed when the entire data set is available. Having the entire 
data set, which comprises all governor requests for aid through FEMA and the subsequent 
presidential approvals or turndowns from 1993-2012, gave a far more accurate picture. 
This rational was further reinforced in that FEMA houses all of this 
information and retrieval of the data from the primary source has no additional cost. This 
further prevented the need to use outside third party sources for the data sets, even if they 
were peer reviewed, such as the work by Sylves (2010). It is always preferable to use 
primary data in a study. 
Data Set 
 
Study data were gathered from primary governmental sources through the use of 
Freedom of Information Requests (FOIA) to the FEMA FOIA office. The federal 
government gathers and compiles an immense amount of data. Congress, in their role as 
oversight and budget regulators, requires specific reports that each agency is mandated to 
give under law (Rosenbloom, Kravchuk, & Clerkin, 2009). The scope of governmental 
data, the methodology used in gathering that data, and the number of years that is 
maintained in these databases make it ideal for congressional studies and third parties alike 
to conduct research. All of the data required for this study were housed within the FEMA 
databases and those of each state. The data were available through a FOIA request 
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and had been confirmed as available through direct contact with that agency’s FOIA 
office. Individual state websites were used to determine who served as the governor in 
each of the years studied and their party affiliation? 
The primary research population was defined as all states where natural disasters 
occurred in 1996, 2004 and 2012. The states affected were Arkansas, Alaska, Alabama, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. In 
addition all US territories and US protectorates were looked at for comparison. In order 
to account for natural disaster randomness and their relative damage in nonpresidential 
election years, the additional research population looking at the years of 1997 through 
2003 and 2005-2011 was used as a baseline comparison in all 50 States, US protectorates 
and US territories. The comparison looked for FEMA aid requests from governors to 
approved FEMA aid from the president during nonreelection years. In addition, types of 
aid were clearly investigated separately for type focused approval or denial. Lastly, the 
data were compared to election battleground states in 1996, 2004 and 2012 in order to 
assess for bias, something that previous research had not investigated using the same 
metrics. 
The data were accessed through governmental historical data as collected and 
reported by FEMA to Congress. The data requested gave the date of each declared 
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disaster from 1996-2004, the type of disaster, and if the request was approved or denied by 
FEMA. This information was stored by the Department of Homeland Security in the 
Mount Weather Emergency Operations Center Emergency Services Division unclassified 
Firehouse Database. In addition the National Archives and Records Administration 
maintain similar records. 
Variables 
 
The variables chosen reflected the bivariate data needed to determine if ingroup 
favoritism was present. Since social identity bias requires a propensity to favor and group 
justification bias revolves around political ideology and self-interest the variables were 
chosen as they were available, measurable, pertain to the subject matter theory, and can 
address the proposed research questions (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). 
Variables included were political party of the president, the requesting states’ 
governor‘s party and whether it matches the sitting president’s, election year or 
nonelection year, reelection year or nonreelection year, type of disaster relief requested 
(HM, PA, IA) and election battleground state. Party was defined as Democrat, 
Republican or Other. These variables were chosen as they were all available in the 
historical data and assumed could answer the four research questions listed in Chapter 1. 
The dependent variable was presidential party. The independent variables were 
party-match/non-match, election year/non-election year, election battleground/non- 








The design consisted of historical primary and secondary data collection from 
governmental sources. The methodology was a quantitative test for association design 
using bivariate data. The purpose of the design was to discover if there was an association 
between presidential party affiliations, the reelection election year, election battleground 
versus nonelection battleground state request for financial aid and the dispensation of 
FEMA funds using chi-square test for fit analysis. Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) Statistics 21 was used to analyze the data once entered. Data collection 
was done in electronic format backed up to a secure offline source. G* Power (Erdfelder, 
Faul, & Buchner, 1996) was used to determine the necessary sample size. No additional 
tools were used. 
Procedures, Instrumentation and Statistical Analysis 
 
I used chi-square test for fit analysis. I examined requested FEMA aid from 
governors to approved FEMA aid from the president. The data gathered were analyzed to 
see if there is a difference between administrations and their use of FEMA funds with 
regard to party affiliation in election battleground states. A significance level of .05 was 
used for the analysis. 
The population data set was the entire set of disasters from 1996-2012. There was 
no sample from the data set to be extracted as all the data were evaluated. The data set 
included 1137 disaster declarations from January 3, 1996 through December 19, 2012. 
This included 158 disaster declaration requests in 1996, 109 disaster declarations in 2004, 
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and 58 in 2012 from the affected States (FEMA, 2012), territories and protectorates which 
were years in which the presidential election occurred. The data set has been verified from 
direct contact to FEMA as well as review of Congressional records. As an alternative 
hypothesis to research question 3, potential significant bias by the president may be 
determined if the data reflects a probability that the awarding of FEMA aid due to party 
affiliation and/or election battleground state is unlikely to be due to chance. In order to 
account for natural disaster randomness and their relative damage, the years of 1997 to 
2003 and 2005-2011 was used as a baseline comparison for FEMA aid requests from 
governors to approved FEMA aid from the president during nonreelection election years. 
While nonreelection election years may still have bias with the use of FEMA funds, the 
comparison was interesting to note but more difficult to establish based on the premise of 
self-interest established in this study criteria. 
The G* Power analysis from the data generates an A priori power of .95 at an 
effect size of .06. The year with the least number of instances was 2012 with 58 while 
2004 had 109. In 1996 there were 158 requests for FEMA aid while the combined three 
reelection election years is 325. The nonreelection years had a total of 812. When all years 
were combined, the total number of instances was 1137. Given that the study effect size 
was between a small and medium effect size both calculations for a priori were used. The 
below calculations represent the small and medium effect size and their sample size A 
priori using G*Power as well as the calculated a priori power (.05) based on a set sample 
size of 267. See Appendix B for test details. 
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Given the need to mediate bias in statistics, Cohen’s (2003) effect size (f²) was 
used as 2004 had slightly more than the required sample size with 109. The entire study, 
1137 instances of FEMA aid requests, approaches the small effect size while maintaining 
the same relative .95 power. As noted above the study will employ a .05 effect size (f²) as 
it is between a small and medium effect size and requires only 261 samples, less than the 
 
three reelection years requests. 
 
The analysis consisted of examining the relationship between the dependent 
variable to the independent variable both on a singular examination as well as in unison. 
The question was whether a predictor variable was able to be identified. In addition it was 
important to note the difference in means, between the turndown/approval of a president 
and the variable involved. The propensity (if above 50%) for a president to act in a 
certain fashion can give insight into his/her analysis of the political economy of their 
decision to approve or turndown a FEMA request when compared over different time 
frames. While alone a mean comparison would not be indicative of a scholarly paper, 
when coupled with the more in depth chi-squared analysis a more clear picture may 
evolve in order to close the gaps in the research and answer the research questions and 
highlight potential associations. It should be noted that according to the Congressional 
Research Service 30 data points are needed to establish statistical significance (Lindsay 
et. al., 2012), and that any data will not show a definite “yes” or “no” to the answer for 
bias, but could lead to the appearance of bias based on the research questions findings. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
This chapter presents the results of the research. The research documentation and 
summation is based on an examination of the data collected and statistical tests run. The 
data were gathered using the preferred method of primary data gathering through several 
FOIA requests to the FOIA department within FEMA. NARA was accessed for their 
Certificates of Ascertainment for each State and each State’s governmental website was 
referred to for knowledge of the political party of the governor at the time the approval or 
turndown occurred based on the date provided by FEMA. Excel was used to organize and 




The data provided by FEMA listed all 50 States and US holdings from 1996-2012 
that requested FEMA aid. Swing States were as follows: 1996: Arizona, Colorado, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia.2004: Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin. 2012: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Virginia. If decisions fell after Nov. 4 for a given swing state the data 
was coded as not having fell in an election year. 
 
Data: Variables Listed and Organized 
 
There were 1211 requests for FEMA aid gathered in the combined data set. Each 
request for aid was further broken down into several variables and labeled into Excel. 
Each dichotomous variable included if aid was given as Individual Aid (IA totaling 493), 
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Hazard Mitigation (HM totaling 939), and Personal Assistance (PA totaling 893). Other 
dichotomous variables included listing if the decision fell in a presidential election year, a 
presidential reelection year, what the party of the president was (554 Republican to 657 
Democratic), the party of the requesting governor (544 Democratic, 31 Independents to 
 
636 Republican), and if the State was an electoral Battleground State (34 times). In total 
there were 1031 Approvals for aid of some fashion. 
Excel and SPSS 
 
All of the information sent by the FEMA FOIA department was in Excel format. 
From the time of request to the time of receipt over a year had passed. Multiple requests 
were asked for as each request failed to give all of the data requested. This information 
was collected via private e-mail and downloaded onto my desktop computer at home and 
was organized into a single file by date of occurrence. Each variable as listed above was 
given its own heading and all data was converted from yes/no dichotomous responses to 
0 and 1’s for coding. The same held true for the listing of Republican, Democratic or 
Independent parties with 0, 1 and 2 listed. The variables were chosen to match previous 
studies and to further test my own suppositions as to what variables could potentially 
influence a president’s decision making process for the approval and turndown phase of a 
FEMA request. The data, State, and designation number given by FEMA are all self- 
descriptive categories. 
Once all of the data were labeled and coded in Excel it was all migrated to SPSS. 
This enabled the data to be more easily manipulated and the outputs from both regression 
analysis and descriptive statistics to be clearer and rendered in more professional format. 
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It should be noted that the data do not control for other variables such as demographic 
data, income levels, party of State Senator or State Representative and the like. All data 
included comes directly from FOIA requests from FEMA and is bivariate in nature. It 
was believed that the data gathered would be able to answer the research questions. 
Chi Square Test of Independence 
 
Understanding the association between each variable, if any, was important to the 
overall ability to answer the 4 research questions. Each qualitative variable was tested for 
association with each other. 
Presidential Party 
 
The first analysis looked at all data from 1996-2012 and if the party of the 
president was associated with the type of aid approved. Table 1 below show that there 
were 1211 instances where PA was either approved or turned down. Of the 1211, PA was 
approved 893 times or 73.7% of the time. Democratic presidents approved PA 77% of the 





Presidents Party * PA Granted Crosstabulation   
  PA Granted   Total 
No Yes 
Count 151 506 657 






















% within PA Granted 47.5% 56.7% 54.3% 
% of Total 12.5% 41.8% 54.3% 
Count  167  387  554 
% within presidents Party 30.1% 69.9% 100.0% 
% within PA Granted 52.5% 43.3% 45.7% 
% of Total 13.8% 32.0% 45.7% 
Count  318  893   1211 
% within presidents Party 26.3% 73.7% 100.0% 
% within PA Granted 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 




The null hypothesis was that there is no relationship between the president’s party 
and PA being approved. However, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis and the findings show that there is evidence of a very strong relationship 
between the president’s party and PA being approved. (chi square = 7.960, df = 1, p= 
.005). That being said, both parties showed a penchant to approve PA when requested with 
Democratic presidents 7% more likely to approve than Republican presidents during the 
studied time frame. 
Public assistance is but one of three types of FEMA aid that can be rendered to 
the States. The next one examined is that of Individual Assistance. Table 2 demonstrates 















IA Granted Total 
No Yes 
Count 399 258 657 
% within Presidents Party 60.7% 39.3% 100.0% 
 % within IA Granted  55.6%  52.3%  54.3% 
 
Presidents Party 
  % of Total  32.9%  21.3%  54.3% 
 Count  319  235  554 
 % within Presidents Party  57.6%  42.4%   100.0% 
Republican  
 % within IA Granted  44.4%  47.7%  45.7% 
  % of Total  26.3%  19.4%  45.7% 
 Count  718  493  1211 
 % within Presidents Party  59.3%  40.7%   100.0% 
Total  
 % within IA Granted  100.0%   100.0%   100.0% 




Table 2 shows that there were 1211 instances where IA was either approved or 
turned down. Of the 1211, IA was approved 493 times or 40.7% of the time. Democratic 
presidents approved PA 39.3% of the time while Republican presidents approved PA 
42.4% of the time. 
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president’s party 
and IA being approved. Because of the high p value, shown in Table 3, there is no 
presumption against the null hypothesis (chi-square = 1.235, df = 1, p= .266). That being 
said, as shown in Table 4, both parties showed a penchant to deny IA when requested 
with Republican presidents 2.1% more likely to approve than Democratic presidents 







Presidents Party * IA Granted Chi-Square 
 
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- 
  sided)   
 Pearson Chi-Square  1.235  1  .266   
 Linear-by-Linear Association  1.234  1  .267   
Value Approx. Sig. 
 
Phi .032 .266 
  Cramer's V  .032  .266   






Presidents Party * HM Granted Crosstabulation 
 
 
HM Granted Total 
No Yes 
Count 158 499 657 
% within presidents 
 
Democratic 
24.0% 76.0% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within HM Granted  58.1%  53.1%  54.3% 
 
Presidents Party 
  % of Total  13.0%  41.2%  54.3% 
 Count  114  440  554 
% within presidents 
 
Republican 
20.6% 79.4% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within HM Granted  41.9%  46.9%  45.7% 
  % of Total  9.4%  36.3%  45.7% 
 Count  272  939  1211 
% within presidents 
 
Total 
22.5% 77.5% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within HM Granted  100.0%   100.0%    100.0% 
  % of Total  22.5%  77.5%    100.0% 
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Table 4 shows that there were 1211 instances where HM was either approved or 
turned down. Of the 1211, HM was approved 939 times or 77.5% of the time. 
Democratic presidents approved PA 76% of the time while Republican presidents 
approved HM 79.4% of the time. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president’s party 
and HM being approved. Because of the high p value, shown in Table 5, there is no 
presumption against the null hypothesis (chi-square = 2.079, df = 1, p= .149). That being 
said, both parties showed a penchant to approve HM when requested with Republican 











Value df Asymp. Sig. 
  (2-sided)   
 Pearson Chi-Square  2.079  1  .149 
Linear-by-Linear  
2.078 1 .149 
 Association   
 
 
 Symmetric Measures   
  Value  Approx. Sig. 
 Phi  .041  .149   
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .041  .149   
 N of Valid Cases  1211 
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Next it is important to see the relationship, if any between the president’s party and 
that of the requesting governor. The below cross tabulation table from SPSS shows that of 
the 1211 requests by governors to presidents for HM, PA and/or IA aid 44.9% of the time 
it was a Democratic governor requesting aid and 52.5% of the time a Republican governor 
asking for aid and an Independent governor asking for aid only 2.6% of the requests from 
1996-2012. Of those requests, Democratic governors requested aid of Democratic 
presidents 51.1% of the time, while Republican governors requested to Republican 
presidents 43.7% of the time. In addition, Democratic governors requested to Republican 
presidents 48.9% of the time, while Republican governors requested aid from Democratic 
presidents 56.3% of the time. Independent governors accounted for 31 of the 










Presidents Party * Governors Party Cross 
 
 
Governors Party Total 
Democratic Republican Independent 
Count 278 358 21 657 
% within 
presidents 42.3% 54.5% 3.2% 100.0% 
 
Democratic 
 Party   
% within 





 Party   
  % of Total  23.0%  29.6%  1.7%  54.3% 
 Count  266  278  10  554 
% within 
presidents 48.0% 50.2% 1.8% 100.0% 
 
Republican 
 Party   
% within 
governors 48.9% 43.7% 32.3% 45.7% 
 Party   
  % of Total  22.0%  23.0%  0.8%  45.7% 
 Count  544  636  31  1211 
% within 
presidents 44.9% 52.5% 2.6% 100.0% 
 
Total 
 Party   
% within 
governors 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Party   




Table 7 depicts the amount of times, as well as the relative percentages, that each 
party had to decide on FEMA aid in their ingroup and outgroup. While the percent’s are 
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interesting from a historical perspective understanding if there is a relationship between 
the variables is necessary to answering the research questions. Below is the chi square 
test for independence. 
Table 7 
 
Presidents Party * Governors Party Chi-Square 
 
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. 
  (2-sided)   
 Pearson Chi-Square  5.510a  2  .064 
Linear-by-Linear 
 Association 
5.114  1  .024 






Nominal by Nominal 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Phi .067  .064 
  Cramer's V  .067  .064   
 N of Valid Cases  1211 
 
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president’s party 
and the requesting States governor’s Party. Because of the moderate p value listed in 
Table 7 there is a low presumption to reject null hypothesis (chi-square = 5.510, df = 2, p 
= .064). It should be no surprise that simply having more requests by one party or that a 
presidential Party might have had more requests made of them would lead to a potentially 
biased effect. It should be remembered that in order to request for FEMA aid, from this 
studies perspective that a natural disaster had to have occurred on that States soil during 
the studied time period. However, just because one party occupied the White House 
while another occupied the State house during a time of a natural disaster does not 
demonstrate the potential for bias, but instead sets the stage for occasions in the data set 
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where one party’s president, the Democratic Party’s, had more opportunity to approve or 
deny their own party’s request and reject or approve their opponents during the studied 
time period of 1996-2012. It is also why listing the percent’s in each case remains 
important to the discussion and in answering the forth research question, because though 
the Republican party occupied the White House less years than the Democratic party 
during the studied period does not indicate that they are more or less inclined to be 
biased, it simply means they had less years in which to impact the turndown and approval 
process. Thus one need to not look at just the counts, but also the frequency of approvals 
and turndowns as defined by the percentages listed. Lastly knowing if the frequency is 
statistically significant to answering the research questions one looks to the chi-square 
crosstabulations to see if the studied data falls within the acceptable range 95% 
confidence level, or p value of .05 or less. 
Table 8 
Presidents Party * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4 Crosstabulation 
 
Decision Falls In Election Year Before 
Nov 4 
No Yes 







% within presidents 
Party 
% within Decision 
Falls In Election Year 

















Count 395 159 




% within Decision 
Falls In Election Year 
Before Nov 4 
45.0% 47.7% 








Count 878 333 




% within Decision 
Falls In Election Year 100.0% 100.0% 
Before Nov 4 




Election years accounted for 5 of the 17 years studied, or 29.4%. As shown in 
Table 9, governors were not more apt to request aid during election years, over non 
election years accounting for only 27.5% of the total requests or 333 of the 1211 
submitted. Each data point collected was dated to occur prior to the presidential election 
date of November 4. If the data occurred on November 5th or later it was attributed to the 
following year. This finding suggests that either there were not additional disasters during 
election years compared to non-election years or that governors did not find the need or 
desire to request for federal aid more so during these times. This further lends credence to 
the suggestion that governors did not find it personally politically valuable to request 
additionally for aid during presidential election cycles as opposed to non-election years. 
Table 9 examined the reelection years and those years accounted for 3 of the 17 
years studied or 17.7%. As was noted in the election year results, the total number of 
requests was also slightly lower than the average for the studied years, numbering 16.6% 
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or 1.1% lower. As during election years, the finding and assumptions remain the same. 
There either were not additional disasters during election years compared to non-election 
years or that governors did not find the need or desire to request for federal aid more so 




 Presidents Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 Crosstabulation   
Decision Falls In 
Reelection Year Before 
  Nov 4   
Total 
  No  Yes   
 Count  529  128  657   




80.5% 19.5% 100.0% 
 Party   
% within Decision 





 Year Before Nov 4   
  % of Total  43.7%  10.6%  54.3%   
 Count  481  73  554   




Republican % within Decision 
Falls In Reelection 
 
 
47.6% 36.3% 45.7% 
 Year Before Nov 4   
  % of Total  39.7%  6.0%  45.7%   
 Count  1010  201  1211   
% within presidents  
83.4% 16.6% 100.0% 
 
Total 
 Party   
% within Decision 
Falls In Reelection 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Year Before Nov 4   





Since it was determined that PA being granted has strong evidence of having a 
relationship to the president’s party it was important to know if the party of the 
requesting governor’s party played an additional relationship to how PA was approved or 
denied. The following cross tabulation table demonstrates the breakdown of PA being 
approved or turned down based on the president’s party and the party of the requesting 
governor. 
PA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When PA aid was granted from 1996- 
 
2012 it was done 893 times. Of those 893 times Republican governors asked for aid a 
 
Republican president for PA aid 278 times and asked a Democratic president for PA aid 
 
358 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted PA by Republican 
presidents 194 times or 69.8% of the time and they were granted PA by Democratic 
presidents 266 times or 74% of the time. There existed a 5% disparity, with Democratic 
presidents granting aid more often to Republican governors than Republic presidents did. 
In addition, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid 278 
times and asked a Republic president for PA aid 266 times. Democratic governors were 
granted aid by Democratic presidents 226 times or 81.3% while they were granted PA aid 
by Republican presidents 186 times or 70.0%. The opposite effect occurred in this 
example with a striking 11.3% disparity. Democratic presidents granted a large majority of 
aid to Democratic governor’s request, yet when requesting aid to a Republican in the 
White House Democratic governors PA approval dropped to 70.0%. 
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When comparing third party requests, the data shows that Independent governors 
requested PA aid 31 times. PA was granted 21 times or 67% of the time. When an 
Independent governor requested aid from a Democratic president (21 times) they were 
approved 14 of those requests or 66.7%. When they requested PA aid from a Republican 
president (10 times) they were approved 7 times or 70%. 
Republican presidents PA approval, regardless of party affiliation remained 
consistent around 70% of the time 74.3% (D) vs 69.8% (R) vs 70.0% (I) with a slight 
favoring of Democratic governors. However Democratic presidents PA approval 
noticeably favored Democratic governors with 81.3% (D), vs 74.3% (R) vs 66.7% (I). 










Governors Party  No Yes Total 
Democratic Ppresidents Democratic Count 52 226 278 
Party % within presidents 18.7% 81.3% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  39.4% 54.9%  51.1%  
 % of Total  9.6%  41.5%  51.1%  Republican  Count    
80  186  266   
% within presidents 30.1% 69.9% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  60.6% 45.1%  48.9%  
  % of Total  14.7% 34.2%  48.9%  
  Total  Count  132  412  544   
 
 
% within presidents 24.3% 75.7%  100.0% 
 Party   
% within PA 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  24.3%  75.7%  100.0% 
Republican Presidents Democratic  Count  92  266  358   
Party % within presidents 25.7% 74.3%  100.0% 
 Party   
% within PA 52.3% 57.8% 56.3% 
 Granted   
 % of Total  14.5%  41.8%  56.3%  Republican  Count 





 % within presidents Party 30.2% 69.8% 100.0% 
% within PA Granted 47.7% 42.2% 43.7% 
% of Total 13.2% 30.5% 43.7% 
Total Count 176 460 636 
 % within presidents Party 27.7% 72.3% 100.0% 
 % within PA Granted 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % of Total 27.7% 72.3% 100.0% 
 
Independent Presidents Democratic Count 7 14 21 
Party % within presidents 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  70.0% 66.7%  67.7%  
 % of Total  22.6% 45.2%  67.7%  Republican  Count  
 3  7  10   
% within presidents 30.0% 70.0% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  30.0% 33.3%  32.3%  
  % of Total  9.7%  22.6%  32.3%  
 
 
Total Count 10 21 31 
% within presidents 32.3% 67.7%  100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total  32.3%  67.7%  100.0% 
Total Presidents Democratic  Count  151  506  657   
Party % within presidents 23.0% 77.0%  100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  47.5%   56.7%   54.3%  
 % of Total  12.5%  41.8%  54.3%  Republican  Count    167 
 387  554   
% within presidents 30.1% 69.9%  100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  52.5%   43.3%   45.7%  
 % of Total  13.8%  32.0%  45.7%  Total Count   318 
 893 1211 
(Continues) 
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% within presidents Party 26.3% 73.7% 100.0% 
% within PA Granted 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 





Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party Chi-Square Tests 
 
 
Governors Pa rty Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.563 1 .002 
Democratic Continuity Correction 8.954 1 .003 
 N of Valid Cases 544   
 Pearson Chi-Square 1.596 1 .207 
Republican Continuity Correction 1.378 1 .240 
 N of Valid Cases 636   
 Pearson Chi-Square .034 1 .853 
Independent 
 Continuity Correction  .000  1  1.000  
 N of Valid Cases 31   
 Pearson Chi-Square 7.960 1 .005 






Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .133 .002 
  N of Valid Cases  544   
 Phi  -.050  .207   
 
Republican 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .050 .207 
  N of Valid Cases  636   
 Phi  .033  .853   
 
Independent 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .033 .853 
  N of Valid Cases  31   
 Phi  -.081  .005   
 
Total 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .081 .005 
  N of Valid Cases  1211 
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The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president’s party 
and PA being approved influenced by the governor’s party. However, there exists enough 
evidence, as is shown in Table 11, to reject the null hypothesis and find that there is 
strong evidence of a relationship between the president’s party and PA being approved 
influenced by the party of the governor. (chi-square = 7.960, df = 1, p= .005). When 
looking at partial analysis one finds that if the party of the requesting governor is 
Independent then there is no relationship between the president’s Party and PA being 
approved (chi-square = .034, df = 1, p= .893) and find no presumption against the null 
hypothesis. When looking at additional partial analysis one finds that’s if the party of the 
requesting governor is Democratic, there is a strong likelihood to affect PA being 
approved based on the party of the president (chi-square = 9.563, df = 1, p= .002). If the 
party of the requesting governor is Republican, than we must assume there is no 
relationship to PA being approved and the party of the president (chi-square = 1.596, df = 
1, p= .207) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis. 
 
The next step is to see if being an election year had an effect on PA being 





Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Election Year 
 
Before Nov 4 Crosstabulation 
 
 
Decision Falls In 
Election Year 
Governors Party PA Granted Total 
No Yes 
 Before Nov 4   




19.2% 80.8%   100.0% 
Democratic  Party   





43.0% 55.6% 52.7% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  10.1%    42.5%    52.7%   




28.3% 71.7%   100.0% 
Democratic Republican  Party   
% within PA 
57.0% 44.4% 47.3% 
 Granted   
No   % of Total  13.4% 33.9% 47.3% 




23.5% 76.5%   100.0% 
Total  Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  23.5%   76.5%  100.0% 








23.0% 77.0%   100.0% 
Party  Party   
% within PA 
Granted 



































































 % within PA Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  % of Total  27.1%    72.9%   100.0% 
 Count  6 8 14 
 % within presidents Party    42.9%    57.1%   100.0% 
Democratic  
 % within PA Granted  75.0%    57.1%    63.6%   
 
Presidents Party 
  % of Total  27.3% 36.4% 63.6% 
 Count  2  6  8   
 % within presidents Party    25.0%    75.0%   100.0% 
Independent Republican  
 % within PA Granted  25.0% 42.9% 36.4% 
  % of Total  9.1%     27.3%    36.4%   
 Count  8  14  22   
 % within presidents Party     36.4% 63.6%    100.0% 
Total  
 % within PA Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  % of Total  36.4%    63.6%   100.0% 
 Count  106 377 483 
 % within presidents Party    21.9%    78.1%   100.0% 
Total Presidents Party   Democratic  
 % within PA Granted  46.9%    57.8%    55.0%   





Count 120 275 395 
% within presidents 
30.4% 69.6%   100.0% 
Republican  Party   
 % within PA Granted  53.1%    42.2%    45.0%   
  % of Total  13.7%    31.3%    45.0%   
 Count  226 652 878 
% within presidents 
Total 
25.7% 74.3%   100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  % of Total  25.7%   74.3%  100.0% 
 Count  12 58 70 







17.1% 82.9%   100.0% 
Democratic  Party   
 % within PA Granted  30.8%    52.7%    47.0%   
  % of Total  8.1%     38.9%    47.0%   
 Count  27 52 79 
% within presidents 
Democratic 
34.2% 65.8%   100.0% 
Republican  Party   
 % within PA Granted  69.2%    47.3%    53.0%   
  % of Total  18.1%    34.9%    53.0%   
 Count  39 110 149 
% within presidents 
Yes Total 
26.2% 73.8%   100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  % of Total  26.2%   73.8%  100.0% 
 Count  32 65 97 













33.0% 67.0%   100.0% 
Democratic  Party   
 % within PA Granted  62.7%    52.4%    55.4%   
  % of Total  18.3%    37.1%    55.4%   
 Count  19 59 78 
% within presidents 
24.4% 75.6%   100.0% 
Republican  Party   
 % within PA Granted  37.3%    47.6%    44.6%   





Count 51 124 175 
% within presidents 
Total 
29.1% 70.9%   100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  % of Total  29.1%   70.9%  100.0% 








% within presidents 
 
 
14.3% 85.7%   100.0% 

























% within presidents  
50.0% 50.0%   100.0% 
Republican  Party   
 % within PA Granted  50.0%    14.3%    22.2%   
  % of Total  11.1%    11.1%    22.2%   
 Count  2 7 9 
% within presidents 
Total 
22.2% 77.8%   100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  % of Total  22.2%   77.8%  100.0% 
 Count  45 129 174 















25.9% 74.1%   100.0% 
Democratic  Party   
 % within PA Granted  48.9%    53.5%    52.3%   
  % of Total  13.5%    38.7%    52.3%   
 Count  47 112 159 
% within presidents 
29.6% 70.4%   100.0% 
Republican  Party   
 % within PA Granted  51.1%    46.5%    47.7%   
  % of Total  14.1%    33.6%    47.7%   
 Count  92 241 333 
Total % within presidents 
Party 
 

























% within presidents    
 Party  
















  % of Total  9.6%     41.5%    51.1%   
 Count  80  186  266   
% within presidents 
 
Total  Democratic 
30.1% 69.9%   100.0% 
Republican  Party   
 % within PA Granted  60.6% 45.1% 48.9% 
  % of Total  14.7%    34.2%    48.9%   
 Count  132  412  544   
% within presidents 
 
Total 
24.3% 75.7%   100.0% 
 Party   





  % of Total  24.3% 75.7% 100.0% 
Count 92 266 358 







25.7% 74.3%   100.0% 
Democratic  Party   
 % within PA Granted  52.3% 57.8% 56.3% 
  % of Total  14.5%    41.8%    56.3%   
 Count  84  194  278   
% within presidents 
 
Republican 
30.2% 69.8%   100.0% 
Republican  Party   
 % within PA Granted  47.7% 42.2% 43.7% 
  % of Total  13.2%    30.5%    43.7%   
 Count  176  460  636   
% within presidents 
 
Total 
27.7% 72.3%   100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 





Count 7 14 21 







33.3% 66.7%   100.0% 
Democratic  Party   
 % within PA Granted  70.0%    66.7%    67.7%   
  % of Total  22.6%    45.2%    67.7%   
 Count  3 7 10 
% within presidents 
Independent 
30.0% 70.0%   100.0% 
Republican  Party   
 % within PA Granted  30.0%    33.3%    32.3%   
  % of Total  9.7%     22.6%    32.3%   
 Count  10 21 31 
% within presidents 
Total 
32.3% 67.7%   100.0% 
 Party   
 % within PA Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  % of Total  32.3%   67.7%  100.0% 
 Count  151 506 657 















23.0% 77.0%   100.0% 
Democratic  Party   
 % within PA Granted  47.5%    56.7%    54.3%   
  % of Total  12.5%    41.8%    54.3%   
 Count  167 387 554 
% within presidents 
30.1% 69.9%   100.0% 
Republican  Party   
 % within PA Granted  52.5%    43.3%    45.7%   
  % of Total  13.8%    32.0%    45.7%   
 Count  318 893 1211 
Total % within presidents  
26.3% 73.7%   100.0% 




% within PA Granted 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
% of Total 26.3% 73.7%   100.0% 
75  
 
As is demonstrated in Table 12, PA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When 
PA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 893 times. PA aid was requested 333 
times during an election year or 37.3% of the overall requests. Of those 333 times 
Republican governors asked for aid a Republican president for PA aid 78 times and asked 
a Democratic president for PA aid 97 times. In that set of data, Republican governors 
were granted PA by Republican presidents 59 times or 75.6% of the time and they were 
granted PA by Democratic presidents 32 times or 67.0% of the time. 
In addition, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid 70 
times and asked a Republic president for PA aid 79 times. Democratic governors were 
granted aid by Democratic presidents 58 times or 82.9% while they were granted PA aid 
by Republican presidents 52 times or 65.8%. This finding supports the notion for PA 
being approved based on political party affiliation during an election year. 
Lastly Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid 7 times and 
asked a Republican president for PA aid 2 times. Independent governors were granted aid 
by Democratic presidents 1 time or 14.3% while they were granted PA aid by Republican 
presidents 1 time or 50%. The relatively low number of requests by Independent governors 





Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Election Year 
 
Before Nov 4 Chi-Square Tests 
 
 
Decision Falls In Election Year Governors Party Value  df   Asymp. Sig. (2- 





4.541 1 .033 
 Square   
Continuity 
4.049 1 .044 
 Correction   





5.183 1 .023 
 Square   
Continuity 
4.713 1 .030 
 Correction   
  N of Valid Cases    461   
No 
Pearson Chi- 
.702 1 .402 
 Square   
Independent Continuity  
.142 1 .706 
 Correction   





8.085 1 .004 
 Square   
Continuity 
7.650 1 .006 
 Correction   





5.573 1 .018 
 Square   
Continuity 
Yes 
4.727 1 .030 
 Correction   











1.170   1 .279 
 Correction   





1.148   1 .284 
 Square   
Continuity 
.011 1 .915 
 Correction   





.568 1 .451 
 Square   
Continuity 
.398 1 .528 
 Correction   





9.563   1 .002 
 Square   
Continuity 
8.954   1 .003 
 Correction   





1.596   1 .207 






1.378   1 .240 
 Correction   
  N of Valid Cases    636   
Pearson Chi- 
.034 1 .853 
 Square   
Independent Continuity  
.000 1 1.000 
 Correction   





7.960   1 .005 
 Square   
Continuity 
7.594   1 .006 
 Correction   





Decision Falls In Election Governors Party Value Approx. 
 Year Before Nov 4  Sig.   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  395   











  V   
 
  N of Valid Cases  461   
No 





  V   
  N of Valid Cases  22   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  878   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  149   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  175   
 





  V   
  N of Valid Cases  9   











  V   














  V   
  N of Valid Cases  544   














  V   
  N of Valid Cases  636   
 





  V   
  N of Valid Cases  31   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  1211   
 
 
Table 13 shows very strong evidence that when PA is approved, holding for 
presidential party, and governor party affiliation regardless if the decision falls during an 
election year to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative (chi-square = 7.960, 
df = 1, p = .005). Partial analysis looking at PA being approved during an election year as 
a whole for all governors parties does not find sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis (chi-square = 1.148, df = 1, p = .451) but during non-election years there 
remains strong evidence to reject the null and accept the alternative (chi-square = 8.085, df 
=1, p = .004). Lastly, it should be noted that in both election years and non-election years 
Democratic governor party affiliation and PA being granted showed very strong 
evidence to reject the null and accept the alternative (chi-square 5.573, df =1, p= .018 and 
chi-square = 4.541, df =1, p = .033 respectively). 
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In continuing with this line of reasoning and looking to answer the research 
questions election years is changed to reelection years holding everything else equal. PA 
was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When PA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was 
done 893 times. PA aid was requested 201 times during a reelection year or 22.5% of the 
overall requests. Of those 201 times Republican governors asked a Republican president 
for PA aid 33 times and asked a Democratic president for PA aid 70 times. In that set of 
data, Republican governors were granted PA by Republican presidents 29 times or 76.7% 
of the time and they were granted PA by Democratic presidents 50 times or 71.4% of the 
time. 
In addition, as Table 14 shows, Democratic governors asked Democratic 
presidents for PA aid 52 times and asked a Republic president for PA aid 39 times. 
Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 44 times or 84.6% 
while they were granted PA aid by Republican presidents 23 times or 59%. This finding 
supports the notion that PA aid favors the president’s party. 
Lastly Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid 6 times and 
asked a Republican president for PA aid 1 time. Independent governors were granted aid 
by Democratic presidents 5 times or 83.3% while they were granted PA aid by 
Republican presidents 1 time or 100%. The relatively low number of requests by 
Independent governors makes this visual statistical difference not significant, other than it 
should be noted that the majority of requests they made for PA during all the studied 






Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before 




governors Party   PA Granted   Total 
No Yes 
 Nov 4   




19.5% 80.5%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
40.7% 52.8% 49.9% 
 Granted   
Presidents 
Party 
  % of Total  9.7% 40.2% 49.9% 






28.2% 71.8%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
59.3% 47.2% 50.1% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  14.1%    36.0%    50.1%   
 Count  108 345 453 
No % within 
 
Total 
23.8% 76.2%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  23.8%   76.2%  100.0% 














25.0% 75.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
47.4% 56.7% 54.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  13.5% 40.5% 54.0% 
 Count  80  165  245   
Republican % within  
32.7% 67.3%   100.0% 





% within PA  
52.6% 43.3% 46.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  15.0% 31.0% 46.0% 




28.5% 71.5%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  28.5%   71.5%  100.0% 




40.0% 60.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
66.7% 60.0% 62.5% 




  % of Total  25.0%    37.5%    62.5%   






33.3% 66.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
33.3% 40.0% 37.5% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  12.5% 25.0% 37.5% 




37.5% 62.5%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  37.5%   62.5%  100.0% 










23.1% 76.9%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
45.4% 54.9% 52.4% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  12.1%    40.3%    52.4%   





% within  
30.6% 69.4%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
54.6% 45.1% 47.6% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  14.6% 33.1% 47.6% 




26.6% 73.4%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  26.6%   73.4%  100.0% 




15.4% 84.6%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
33.3% 65.7% 57.1% 




  % of Total  8.8%     48.4%    57.1%   






41.0% 59.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
66.7% 34.3% 42.9% 
 Granted   
 
Yes 
  % of Total  17.6% 25.3% 42.9% 




26.4% 73.6%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  26.4%   73.6%  100.0% 








28.6% 71.4%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
83.3% 63.3% 68.0% 
 Granted   









12.1% 87.9%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
16.7% 36.7% 32.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  3.9%     28.2%    32.0%   




23.3% 76.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  23.3% 76.7%   100.0% 




16.7% 83.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%   83.3% 85.7% 




  % of Total  14.3%    71.4%    85.7%   






0.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
0.0% 16.7% 14.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  0.0%     14.3%    14.3%   




14.3% 85.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  14.3% 85.7%   100.0% 






22.7% 77.3%   100.0% 
Democratic  presidents Party   
% within PA 
59.2% 65.1% 63.7% 





% of Total 14.4% 49.3% 63.7% 




27.4% 72.6%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
40.8% 34.9% 36.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  10.0%    26.4%    36.3%   




24.4% 75.6%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  24.4%   75.6%  100.0% 




18.7% 81.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
39.4% 54.9% 51.1% 
 Granted   
Presidents 
Party 
  % of Total  9.6% 41.5% 51.1% 











30.1% 69.9%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
60.6% 45.1% 48.9% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  14.7%    34.2%    48.9%   




24.3% 75.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  24.3%   75.7%  100.0% 











25.7% 74.3%   100.0% 





% within PA  
52.3% 57.8% 56.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  14.5% 41.8% 56.3% 




30.2% 69.8%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
47.7% 42.2% 43.7% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  13.2%    30.5%    43.7%   




27.7% 72.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  27.7%   72.3%  100.0% 




33.3% 66.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
70.0% 66.7% 67.7% 
 Granted   
Presidents 
Party 
  % of Total  22.6% 45.2% 67.7% 






30.0% 70.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
30.0% 33.3% 32.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  9.7%     22.6%    32.3%   




32.3% 67.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  32.3%   67.7%  100.0% 
Presidents 
Total Democratic  Count 151 506 657 





% within  
23.0% 77.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
47.5% 56.7% 54.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  12.5% 41.8% 54.3% 




30.1% 69.9%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
52.5% 43.3% 45.7% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  13.8%    32.0%    45.7%   




26.3% 73.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within PA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   




Looking at Table 15 there exists very strong evidence that when PA is approved, 
holding for presidential party, and governor party affiliation regardless if the decision 
falls during an election year to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative (chi- 
square = 7.960, df = 1, p = .005). Partial analysis looking at PA being approved during an 
reelection year as a whole for all governors parties does not find sufficient evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis (chi-square = .567, df = 1, p = .659) but during non-reelection 
years there remains very strong evidence to reject the null and accept the alternative (chi- 
square = 7.250, df =1, p = .007). Lastly, it should be noted that in both election years and 
non-reelection years Democratic governor party affiliation and PA being granted showed 
very strong evidence to reject the null and accept the alternative (chi-square 7.546, df =1, 






Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before 
 Nov 4 Chi-Square Tests 
Decision Falls In Reelection Year governors Party Value  df  Asymp. Sig. (2- 





4.748 1 .029 
 Square   
Continuity 
4.280 1 .039 
 Correction   





3.804 1 .051 
 Square   
Continuity 
3.437 1 .064 
 Correction   
  N of Valid Cases    533   
No 
Pearson Chi- 
.107 1 .744 
 Square   
Independent Continuity  
.000 1 1.000 
 Correction   





7.250 1 .007 
 Square   
Continuity 
6.872 1 .009 
 Correction   





7.546 1 .006 





6.283 1 .012 
 Correction   




3.396 1 .065 
 Square   
Continuity 













.194 1 .659 
 Square   
Continuity 
.000 1 1.000 
 Correction   





.567 1 .452 
 Square   
Continuity 
.339 1 .561 
 Correction   





9.563   1 .002 
 Square   
Continuity 
8.954   1 .003 
 Correction   





1.596   1 .207 






1.378   1 .240 
 Correction   
  N of Valid Cases    636   
Pearson Chi- 
.034 1 .853 
 Square   
Independent Continuity  
.000 1 1.000 
 Correction   





7.960   1 .005 
 Square   
Continuity 
7.594   1 .006 
 Correction   
  N of Valid Cases   1211   
Decision Falls In 
Reelection Year 
Before Nov 4 















  V   
  N of Valid Cases   453    







  V   
 
  N of Valid Cases  533   
No 





  V   
  N of Valid Cases    24    







  V   
  N of Valid Cases   1010    







  V   
  N of Valid Cases    91    










  V   
  N of Valid Cases    103    








  V   
  N of Valid Cases    7    







  V   
  N of Valid Cases   201    
Phi  -.133  .002   












N of Valid Cases 544 









  V   
  N of Valid Cases   636    







  V   













  V   




In continuing with this line of reasoning and looking to answer the research 
questions, is to add battleground states to the analysis below holding everything else equal. 
As one can see from the statistical percent’s, the number of cases where PA was both in an 
electoral battleground state and during a reelection year was quite tiny relative to times it 
was requested in non-reelection years in non-battleground states. PA was approved or 
denied in 1211 cases. When PA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 
893 times. PA aid was requested 33 times during a reelection year in a battleground state 
or 3.7% of the overall requests. Of those 33 times Republican governors asked a 
Republican president for PA aid 6 times and asked a Democratic president for PA aid 14 
times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted PA by Republican 
presidents 5 times or 83.3% of the time and they were granted PA by Democratic 
presidents 9 times or 64.3% of the time. This further supports the notion for like-party 
92  
 
affiliation, reelection year and battleground states all playing a role in PA being 
approved. 
Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid during reelection 
years in battleground states 6 times and asked Republican presidents for aid 7 times. In 
that data set Democratic presidents granted PA aid 100% of the time and Republican 
presidents only granted aid 42.9% of the time. 
Lastly no Independent governor occupied a State house in a battleground state to 
compare third party variables during the data set. To know if the results were statistically 




Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year 





Decision Falls In 
Reelection Year 
Before Nov 4 
 

















19.5% 80.5%   100.0% 
 
 
40.7% 52.9% 50.0% 
 
 





% of Total 9.7% 40.3% 50.0% 













28.3% 71.7%   100.0% 
 
 
59.3% 47.1% 50.0% 
 
% of Total 14.2% 35.8% 50.0% 
 









23.9% 76.1%   100.0% 




100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 23.9% 76.1%   100.0% 
 




















25.0% 75.0%   100.0% 
 
 
47.4% 56.7% 54.0% 
Republican  
Party 
% of Total 13.5% 40.5% 54.0% 
 








32.7% 67.3%   100.0% 








% of Total 15.0% 31.0% 46.0% 
 













28.5% 71.5%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 28.5% 71.5%   100.0% 
 




















40.0% 60.0%   100.0% 
 
 
66.7% 60.0% 62.5% 
Independent  
Party 
% of Total 25.0% 37.5% 62.5% 
 








33.3% 66.7%   100.0% 
 











% of Total 12.5% 25.0% 37.5% 
 













37.5% 62.5%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 37.5% 62.5%   100.0% 
 



























23.1% 76.9%   100.0% 
 
 
45.4% 55.0% 52.4% 


















54.6% 45.0% 47.6% 
 
% of Total 14.6% 33.0% 47.6% 
 













26.7% 73.3%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 26.7% 73.3%   100.0% 
 
























17.4% 82.6%   100.0% 
 
 
40.0% 65.5% 59.0% 
 
% of Total 10.3% 48.7% 59.0% 
 







37.5% 62.5%   100.0% 




60.0% 34.5% 41.0% 
 
% of Total 15.4% 25.6% 41.0% 
 













25.6% 74.4%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 25.6% 74.4%   100.0% 
 
























26.8% 73.2%   100.0% 
 
 
83.3% 63.1% 67.5% 
 
% of Total 18.1% 49.4% 67.5% 
 








11.1% 88.9%   100.0% 




16.7% 36.9% 32.5% 
 
% of Total 3.6% 28.9% 32.5% 
 













21.7% 78.3%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 21.7% 78.3%   100.0% 
 



















16.7% 83.3%   100.0% 
 
 






% of Total 14.3% 71.4% 85.7% 
 













0.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
 
 
0.0% 16.7% 14.3% 
 
% of Total 0.0% 14.3% 14.3% 
 













14.3% 85.7%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 14.3% 85.7%   100.0% 
 






















22.2% 77.8%   100.0% 
 
 
61.5% 65.1% 64.3% 
 

















25.0% 75.0%   100.0% 
 
 
38.5% 34.9% 35.7% 
 
% of Total 8.9% 26.8% 35.7% 
 













23.2% 76.8%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 


















19.1% 80.9%   100.0% 




40.6% 54.7% 51.3% 
 
% of Total 9.8% 41.5% 51.3% 
 













29.5% 70.5%   100.0% 
 
 
59.4% 45.3% 48.7% 
 
% of Total 14.3% 34.3% 48.7% 
 













24.2% 75.8%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 24.2% 75.8%   100.0% 
 




















25.3% 74.7%   100.0% 
 
 




% of Total 14.1% 41.7% 55.8% 
 













30.5% 69.5%   100.0% 
 
 
48.8% 42.4% 44.2% 
 
% of Total 13.5% 30.7% 44.2% 
 








27.6% 72.4%   100.0% 
 











% of Total 27.6% 72.4%   100.0% 
 













33.3% 66.7%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 22.6% 45.2% 67.7% 

















30.0% 70.0%   100.0% 
 
 
30.0% 33.3% 32.3% 
 
% of Total 9.7% 22.6% 32.3% 
 













32.3% 67.7%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 













Count 146 491 637 
 
% within 









47.4% 56.5% 54.1% 
 
% of Total 12.4% 41.7% 54.1% 
 













30.0% 70.0%   100.0% 
 
 
52.6% 43.5% 45.9% 
 
% of Total 13.8% 32.1% 45.9% 
 







26.2% 73.8%   100.0% 




100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 26.2% 73.8%   100.0% 
 


















100.0%  100.0% 
 
 




% of Total 100.0%  100.0% 


















100.0%  100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 100.0%  100.0% 
 























100.0%  100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 100.0%  100.0% 
 








100.0%  100.0% 




100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 100.0%  100.0% 
 



















0.0%    100.0%  100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 0.0% 46.2% 46.2% 
 













57.1% 42.9%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%   33.3% 53.8% 
 
% of Total 30.8% 23.1% 53.8% 
 













30.8% 69.2%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 30.8% 69.2%   100.0% 
 



























35.7% 64.3%   100.0% 
 
 
83.3% 64.3% 70.0% 


















16.7% 35.7% 30.0% 
 
% of Total 5.0% 25.0% 30.0% 
 













30.0% 70.0%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 


















25.0% 75.0%   100.0% 




50.0% 65.2% 60.6% 
 
% of Total 15.2% 45.5% 60.6% 
 













38.5% 61.5%   100.0% 
 
 
50.0% 34.8% 39.4% 
 
% of Total 15.2% 24.2% 39.4% 
 













30.3% 69.7%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 30.3% 69.7%   100.0% 
 
























0.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
 
 
0.0% 60.0% 42.9% 
 
% of Total 0.0% 42.9% 42.9% 
 








50.0% 50.0%   100.0% 




100.0%   40.0% 57.1% 
 
% of Total 28.6% 28.6% 57.1% 
 








28.6% 71.4%   100.0% 
 










% of Total 28.6% 71.4%   100.0% 
 













35.7% 64.3%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 25.0% 45.0% 70.0% 

















16.7% 83.3%   100.0% 
 
 
16.7% 35.7% 30.0% 
 
% of Total 5.0% 25.0% 30.0% 
 













30.0% 70.0%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 30.0% 70.0%   100.0% 
 






















25.0% 75.0%   100.0% 
 
 
50.0% 62.5% 58.8% 
 

















35.7% 64.3%   100.0% 
 
 
50.0% 37.5% 41.2% 
 
% of Total 14.7% 26.5% 41.2% 
 







29.4% 70.6%   100.0% 




100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 29.4% 70.6%   100.0% 
 













19.5% 80.5%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 9.7% 40.2% 49.9% 

















28.2% 71.8%   100.0% 
 
 




% of Total 14.1% 36.0% 50.1% 
 













23.8% 76.2%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 23.8% 76.2%   100.0% 
 




















25.0% 75.0%   100.0% 
 
 




% of Total 13.5% 40.5% 54.0% 
 








32.7% 67.3%   100.0% 
 











% of Total 15.0% 31.0% 46.0% 
 













28.5% 71.5%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 28.5% 71.5%   100.0% 
 













40.0% 60.0%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 25.0% 37.5% 62.5% 

















33.3% 66.7%   100.0% 
 
 
33.3% 40.0% 37.5% 
 
% of Total 12.5% 25.0% 37.5% 
 













37.5% 62.5%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 













Count 122 407 529 
 
% within 








45.4% 54.9% 52.4% 
 
% of Total 12.1% 40.3% 52.4% 
 













30.6% 69.4%   100.0% 
 
 
54.6% 45.1% 47.6% 
 
% of Total 14.6% 33.1% 47.6% 
 













26.6% 73.4%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 26.6% 73.4%   100.0% 
 













15.4% 84.6%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 8.8% 48.4% 57.1% 























41.0% 59.0%   100.0% 
 
 
66.7% 34.3% 42.9% 
 
% of Total 17.6% 25.3% 42.9% 
 













26.4% 73.6%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 




























28.6% 71.4%   100.0% 




83.3% 63.3% 68.0% 
 
% of Total 19.4% 48.5% 68.0% 
 













12.1% 87.9%   100.0% 
 
 
16.7% 36.7% 32.0% 
 
% of Total 3.9% 28.2% 32.0% 
 













23.3% 76.7%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 23.3% 76.7%   100.0% 
 













16.7% 83.3%   100.0% 
 
 









% of Total 14.3% 71.4% 85.7% 
 













0.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
 
 
0.0% 16.7% 14.3% 
 












14.3% 85.7%   100.0% 








% of Total 14.3% 85.7%   100.0% 
 













22.7% 77.3%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 14.4% 49.3% 63.7% 

















27.4% 72.6%   100.0% 
 
 
40.8% 34.9% 36.3% 
 
% of Total 10.0% 26.4% 36.3% 
 













24.4% 75.6%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 24.4% 75.6%   100.0% 
 



























18.7% 81.3%   100.0% 
 
 
39.4% 54.9% 51.1% 




















60.6%    45.1% 48.9% 
 
% of Total 14.7%    34.2% 48.9% 
 








24.3% 75.7%   100.0% 




100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 24.3% 75.7%   100.0% 
 













25.7% 74.3%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 14.5% 41.8% 56.3% 

















30.2% 69.8%   100.0% 
 
 
47.7% 42.2% 43.7% 
 
% of Total 13.2% 30.5% 43.7% 
 













27.7% 72.3%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 27.7% 72.3%   100.0% 
 






















33.3% 66.7%   100.0% 
 
 
70.0% 66.7% 67.7% 
 

















30.0% 70.0%   100.0% 
 
 
30.0% 33.3% 32.3% 
 

















32.3% 67.7%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 32.3% 67.7%   100.0% 
 













23.0% 77.0%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 12.5% 41.8% 54.3% 

















30.1% 69.9%   100.0% 
 
 
52.5% 43.3% 45.7% 
 
% of Total 13.8% 32.0% 45.7% 
 













26.3% 73.7%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 








Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year 






Decision Falls In Reelection Year 
 























































































4.866 1 .027 
 
 
4.392 1 .036 
 
 
3.804 1 .051 
 
 
3.437 1 .064 
 
 
.107 1 .744 
 
 
.000 1 1.000 
 
 
7.361 1 .007 
 
 
6.979 1 .008 
 
 
4.002 1 .045 
 
 
3.017 1 .082 
 
 
2.635 1 .105 
 
 
1.793 1 .181 
 
 
.194 1 .659 
 
 
















.167 1 .683 
 
 
.047 1 .827 









7.728 1 .005 
 
 
7.173 1 .007 

























2.075 1 .150 
 
 
1.821 1 .177 
 
 
.034 1 .853 
 
 
.000 1 1.000 









7.583 1 .006 
 
 
7.220 1 .007 





































2.633 1 .105 
















.102 1 .749 




Pearson Chi-  




 Square   
 
Continuity 
.189 1 .664 












4.200 1 .040 
 
 
2.107 1 .147 











.726 1 .394 
 
 
.102 1 .749 









.455 1 .500 
 
 
.086 1 .770 









4.748 1 .029 
 
 
4.280 1 .039 











3.804 1 .051 
 
 
3.437 1 .064 









.107 1 .744 
 
 














7.250 1 .007 
 
 
6.872 1 .009 









7.546 1 .006 
 
 
6.283 1 .012 

























3.396 1 .065 
 
 
2.538 1 .111 
 
 
.194 1 .659 
 
 
.000 1 1.000 









.567 1 .452 
 
 
.339 1 .561 









9.563 1 .002 
 
 
8.954 1 .003 













1.596 1 .207 
 
 
1.378 1 .240 









.034 1 .853 
 
 
.000 1 1.000 













7.594 1 .006 





Decision Falls In 
Reelection Year 
Governors Party Value  Approx. 
Sig. 
 State  Before Nov 4   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  452   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  533   
No 
 Phi  .067  .744   
Nominal by 
Cramer's 
Independent Nominal .067 .744 
  V   
  N of Valid Cases  24 











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  1009   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  78   














  V   
  N of Valid Cases  83 











  V   












Phi -.032 .683 
Cramer's 
.032 .683 
  V   
  N of Valid Cases  168   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  530 














  V   
  N of Valid Cases  616   
 Phi  .033 .853 
Nominal by 
Cramer's 
Independent Nominal .033 .853 
  V   
  N of Valid Cases  31   











  V   





 Nominal   








  N of Valid Cases  1   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  13   
















N of Valid Cases 20 











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  33   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  14   














  V   
  N of Valid Cases  20 











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  34   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  453   














  V   
  N of Valid Cases  533 
 Phi  .067  .744   
Nominal by 
Cramer's 
Independent Nominal .067 .744 
  V   
  N of Valid Cases  24   











  V   








Nominal Cramer's  
.288 .006 
  V   
  N of Valid Cases  91 











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  103   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  7   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  201 











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  544   














  V   
  N of Valid Cases  636   
 Phi  .033  .853   
Nominal by 
Cramer's 
Independent Nominal .033 .853 
  V   
  N of Valid Cases  31 











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  1211   
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In the chi-squared test for fit table, Table 17, comparing PA approved, 
presidential and governor party affiliations, reelection year and battleground state, the 
results are striking. 
In further partial analysis Democratic governors who were granted PA aid in non- 
electoral battleground states in non-reelection years also finds evidence against the null 
hypothesis and accept the alternative (chi-squared = 4.866, df = 1, p = .027) and in 
reelection years but still not in battleground states the Democratic governors who were 
approved PA again demonstrate enough evidence against the null hypothesis and accept 
the alternative (chi-squared =4.002, df = 1, p = .045). Similar findings were shown in 
battleground states during reelection years with PA being awarded to Democratic 
governors showing enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative (chi-squared = 4.952, df = 1, p = .026). As an overall analysis there is very 
strong evidence to reject the null and support the alternative hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between presidential party affiliation, gubernatorial party affiliation, 
reelection years and battleground state (chi-square = 7.960, df = 1, p = .005). These 
results support the notion for potential bias with the use of federal funds, specifically as it 
applies to FEMA PA funding. 
One of the ways to summarize the findings is to look at relative percentage of 
approval from the general sample to that of the final assumptive variable relationship. As 
was stated at the beginning PA was requested 1211 time of which, PA was approved 893 
times or 73.7% of the time. Democratic presidents approved PA 77% of the time while 
Republican presidents approved PA 69.9% of the time. The final assumptive results 
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showed that during non-reelection years Democratic presidents approved Democratic 
governors 80.5% and Republic governors 71.7%, Republican presidents in that same data 
set approved Republican governors 67.3% and Democratic governors 75%. Once it was a 
reelection year those numbers changed with Republican presidents favoring Republican 
governors at 88.9% and granting aid to Democratic governors a dropped amount to 
73.2%. Democratic presidents likewise changed their approvals during reelection years 
approving Democratic governors 82.6% of the time and Republican governors only 
62.5%. Once the variable of a battleground state was thrown in, Republican presidents 
approved PA to republican governors 88.9% of the time and Democratic governors 
73.2% while Democratic presidents approved Democratic governors an astonishing 100% 
 
of the time and only 42.9% to Republican governors. 
 
Two stark consistencies can be seen in the percentages alone. First in-party 
favoring increases as the stakes for potential bias increase with the Republican president 
showing a 69.9% overall base, 67.3% non-election, 88.9% reelection and 83.3% 
battleground state. Conversely opposing party was based at 69.9%, 75% non-election 
years, 73.2 re-election years and down to 64.3% in battleground States. The same pattern 
remained for Democratic presidents showing an overall 77.0% base, 80.5% non-election, 
82.6% reelection and 100% battleground State. The opposing party pattern remained at 
 
71.7% non-election, 62.5% reelection year and 42.9% battleground state. 
 
To place it in terms of the hypothesis the research questions null and alternative 
hypothesis are again listed below, along with the corresponding answers. 
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1. Is there a statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA 
aid approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governor 
during times of natural disasters during 1996, 2004 and 2012? 
H10: There is no statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA 
aid approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governors during times of 
natural disasters in 1996, 2004 and 2012. 
H1a: There is a statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA aid 
approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governor during times of natural 
disasters in 1996, 2004 and 2012. 
In the first question it has been shown that FEMA aid, specifically PA, has a very 
strong assumption against the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative with a chi-square 
of 7.960, df =1, p=.005 when comparing the relationship of presidential political party, PA 
approval, party of the governor, reelection year and battleground state. 
2. Is there a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals 
depending on the political party of the requesting governor and the party 
of the president and approvals in 1996, 2004 and 2012? 
H20: There is no statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals 
between the political party of the requesting governor and the party of the president 
during 1996, 2004 and 2012. 
H2a: There is a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals between 
the political party of the requesting governor and the party of the president during 1996, 
2004 and 2012. 
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Once again, using PA, there is strong evidence to reject the null and accept the 
alternative hypothesis. 
3. Is there a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals 
depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 
and 2012 compared to requests in the same year? 
H20: There is no statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals 
depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 and 2012 
compared to requests in the same year. 
H2a: There is a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals 
depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 and 2012 
compared to requests in the same year. 
For PA, it did not seem that being a Battleground State made a statistically 
significant difference compared to non-battleground states. This did not mean there was 
not a % difference in how the presidents acted, just that those actions were not significant 
to the overall difference. It should be noted again that the data set had few overall 
battleground states compared to the large dataset as a whole. 
4. Is potential bias present with regard to the use of FEMA funds by one or 
more presidents during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non-election 
years during that same time period? 
H20: There is no significant bias between the presidents with regard to the 
allocation of the use of FEMA funds during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non- 
election years during that same time period. 
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H2a: There is the appearance of bias with one or more presidents with the use of 
FEMA funds during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non-election years during that 
same time period. 
To answer this question one must refer back to how bias would be defined in the 
research. Labeling bias is often a judgment call done through the lens of a reasonable 
person and can be established statistically over multiple decisions. Chapter 1 theorized 
that… 
…a president could 
 
1. Act in a manner that favors self-interest with FEMA dispensation. 
 
2. Allocate resources to favor his collective (party) interests. 
 
3. Be notable during times when his discretionary powers would favor self 
 
(reelection years in election battleground states). 
 
Remember bias cannot be proven using a chi-squared test for fit, only that an 
association may or may not exist and its relative strength. If PA was the sole type of 
FEMA aid that was rendered than it would appear that there could be the possibility of bias 
but without further testing, such as gathering more data and using logistic regression 
analysis, this cannot be stated for certain. The % of variance alone from base line non- 
election years to how each party president approved their own ingroup and disproved the 
other in both reelection years and when in battleground states shows a propensity to act in 
a potentially self-serving way but does not prove the existence of bias. As was discussed in 
chapter 3, propensity was defined as turndowns/approvals above 50% and that any data 
will not show a definite “yes” or “no” to the answer for bias, but could lead to the 
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appearance of bias. The data must be presented at face value, and allow a reasonable 
person to make the judgment call. 
Hazard Mitigation 
 
It was earlier shown that there appeared to be no apparent association between the 
president’s party and HM being granted. Yet it was important to know if the party of the 
requesting governor’s party played an additional relationship to how HM was approved 
or denied. Table 19 demonstrates the breakdown of HM being approved or turned down 
based on the president’s party and the party of the requesting governor. 
Table 19 shows that HM was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When HM aid was 
granted from 1996-2012 it was done 939 times. Of those 939 times Republican governors 
asked for aid a Republican president for HM aid 278 times and asked a Democratic 
president for HM aid 358 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted 
HM by Republican presidents 212 times or 76.3% of the time and they were granted HM 
by Democratic presidents 261 times or 72.9% of the time. There existed a 
3.4% disparity, with Republican presidents granting aid more often to Republican 
governors than Democratic presidents did. 
Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for HM aid 278 times and 
asked a Republic president for HM aid 266 times. Democratic governors were granted aid 
by Democratic presidents 225 times or 80.9% while they were granted HM aid by 






Presidents Party * HM Granted * Governors Party Crosstabulation   
governors Party   HM Granted      Total 
  No  Yes   
 Count  53  225  278   







19.1% 80.9% 100.0% 
Democratic  Party     
 % within HM Granted   55.2%    50.2%    51.1%   
  % of Total  9.7%  41.4%    51.1%   
 Count  43  223  266   
% within presidents 
 
Democratic 
16.2% 83.8% 100.0% 
Republican   Party     
 % within HM Granted   44.8%    49.8%    48.9%   
  % of Total  7.9%  41.0%    48.9%   
 Count  96  448  544   
% within presidents 
 
Total 
17.6% 82.4% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within HM Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  % of Total  17.6%    82.4%   100.0% 
 Count  97  261  358   







27.1% 72.9% 100.0% 
Democratic  Party     
 % within HM Granted   59.5%    55.2%    56.3%   
  % of Total  15.3%    41.0%    56.3%   
 Count  66  212  278   
% within presidents 
 
Republican 
23.7% 76.3% 100.0% 
Republican   Party     
 % within HM Granted   40.5%    44.8%    43.7%   
  % of Total  10.4%    33.3%    43.7%   
 Count  163  473  636   
% within presidents 
 
Total 
25.6% 74.4% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within HM Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 





Count 8 13 21 







38.1% 61.9% 100.0% 
Democratic  Party     
 % within HM Granted   61.5%    72.2%    67.7%   
  % of Total  25.8%    41.9%    67.7%   
 Count  5  5  10   
% within presidents 
 
Independent 
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Republican   Party     
 % within HM Granted   38.5%    27.8%    32.3%   
  % of Total  16.1%    16.1%    32.3%   
 Count  13  18  31   
% within presidents 
 
Total 
41.9% 58.1% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within HM Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  % of Total  41.9%    58.1%   100.0% 
 Count  158  499  657   







24.0% 76.0% 100.0% 
Democratic  Party     
 % within HM Granted   58.1%    53.1%    54.3%   
  % of Total  13.0%    41.2%    54.3%   
 Count  114  440  554   
% within presidents 
 
Total 
20.6% 79.4% 100.0% 
Republican   Party     
 % within HM Granted   41.9%    46.9%    45.7%   
  % of Total  9.4%  36.3%    45.7%   
 Count  272  939  1211   
% within presidents 
 
Total 
22.5% 77.5% 100.0% 
 Party   
 % within HM Granted  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
  % of Total  22.5%    77.5%   100.0% 
126  
 
Lastly Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for HM aid 21 times 
and asked a Republican president for HM aid 10 times. Independent governors were 
granted aid by Democratic presidents 13 times or 61.9% while they were granted HM aid 
by Republican presidents 5 times or 50%. The relatively low number of requests by 
Independent governors makes this visual statistical difference not significant. 
When looking at Table 20, there is not enough evidence for a presumption against 
the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the 
president’s party and HM being approved influenced by the governor’s party (chi-square 
= 2.079, df = 1, p= .149). Furthermore, when looking at partial analysis one finds that if 
the party of the requesting governor is Independent then there is no relationship between 
the president’s Party and HM being approved (chi-square = .394, df = 1, p= .530) and fail 
to reject null hypothesis. When looking at additional partial analysis one finds that’s if 
the party of the requesting governor is Democratic, then there is no relationship between 
the president’s Party and HM being approved (chi-square = .786, df = 1, p= .375) and 
find no presumption against the null hypothesis.. Lastly if the party of the requesting 
governor is Republican, than we must assume there is no relationship to HM being 
approved and the party of the president (chi-square = .924, df = 1, p= .337) and find no 
presumption against the null hypothesis. 
It has been suggested that party affiliation might not play a role in FEMA aid 
allocation. Needing to test for this the variable, governor party affiliation was taken out 









Presidents Party * HM Granted * Governors Party Chi-Square Tests 
governors Party Value df Asymp. Sig. 
  (2-sided)   
 Pearson Chi-Square  .786  1  .375   
Democratic Continuity 
.599  1  .439   
  Correction   
 Pearson Chi-Square  .924 1 .337 
Republican Continuity 
.756  1  .385   
  Correction   
 Pearson Chi-Square  .394  1  .530   
Independent Continuity 
.057  1  .811   
  Correction   
 Pearson Chi-Square  2.079  1  .149   
Total Continuity 
1.885 1 .170 
  Correction   






 Phi  .038  .375   
Cramer's V .038 .375 






 Phi  .038  .337   
Cramer's V .038 .337 






 Phi  -.113  .530   
Cramer's V .113 .530 






 Phi  .041  .149   
Cramer's V .041 .149 






Presidents Party * HM Granted * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4 
 Crosstabulation   
Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4     HM Granted     Total 
   No  Yes    
Count  129   354  483   
% within presidents 
Party 













% of Total 14.7% 40.3% 55.0% 
Count  84  311   395 
% within presidents 
 
No Republican 
21.3% 78.7% 100.0% 
Party     
% within HM 
39.4% 46.8% 45.0% 
Granted     
  % of Total  9.6%  35.4%   45.0%  
Count   213    665  878   
% within presidents  
24.3% 75.7% 100.0% 
 
Total 
Party   
% within HM  
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Granted   
  % of Total  24.3%   75.7%  100.0% 
Count   29  145  174   
% within presidents 
16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 






% within HM 
49.2% 52.9% 52.3% 
Granted   
Yes  
Party 
  % of Total  8.7%  43.5%    52.3%  
Count  30  129  159   
% within presidents 
 
Republican 
18.9% 81.1% 100.0% 
Party     
% within HM 
 
Granted 






% of Total 9.0% 38.7% 47.7% 
Count 59 274 333 
Total % within presidents  
17.7% 82.3% 100.0% 




% within HM  
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  17.7%   82.3%  100.0% 
 Count  158  499  657   
% within presidents 
24.0% 76.0% 100.0% 












% of Total 13.0% 41.2% 54.3% 
Count   114  440   554 





20.6% 79.4% 100.0% 
 Party   
% within HM 
41.9% 46.9% 45.7% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  9.4%  36.3%    45.7%  
 Count  272  939  1211   
% within presidents  
22.5% 77.5% 100.0% 
 
Total 
 Party   
% within HM  
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  22.5%   77.5%  100.0% 
 
 
Looking at the Table 20 HM was approved or denied in 1211 cases. Of those 
 
1211 cases 333 requests for HM aid were made during election years. Democratic 
presidents approved 145 of 174 or 83.3% requests for aid during election years while 
Republican presidents approved 129 out of 159 or 81.1%. The percentages do not 
demonstrate a large statistical difference. During non-election years Democratic 
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presidents approved 73.3% of the requests for HM aid while the Republican president 
approved 78.7%. To know if the results are statistically significant the chi square test for 




Presidents Party * HM Granted * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4 Chi- 
 Square Tests   
Decision Falls In Election Year Governors Party Value  df   Asymp. Sig. (2- 




1.035 1 .309 
 Square   
Continuity 
.791 1 .374 




1.734 1 .188 
 Square   
Continuity 
1.467 1 .226 
  Correction   
No 
Pearson Chi- 
.105 1 .746 





.000 1 1.000 




3.503 1 .061 
 Square   
Continuity 
3.213 1 .073 




.036 1 .849 
 Square   
Continuity 
.000 1 1.000 
 
Yes 
  Correction   
Pearson Chi- 
.154 1 .695 












Pearson Chi-  
3.938 1 .047 
 
Independent 
 Square   
Continuity 
.502 1 .479 




Pearson Chi-  
.276 1 .599 
 
Total 
 Square   
Continuity 
.146 1 .703 




.786 1 .375 
 Square   
Continuity 
.599 1 .439 




.924 1 .337 
 Square   
Continuity 
.756 1 .385 
 
Total 
  Correction   
Pearson Chi- 
.394 1 .530 





.057 1 .811 




2.079 1 .149 
 Square   
Continuity 
1.885 1 .170 
  Correction   
Decision Falls In 
Election Year Before 
Governors Party Value Approx. Sig. 
 Nov 4   











  V   
No 












  V   
  N of Valid Cases  461   









  V   













  V   
































  V   








  .661   
Cramer's 
.661 .047 
  V   













N of Valid Cases 333 











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  544   









  V   








  .113   
Cramer's 
.113 .530 
  V   
  N of Valid Cases  31   









  V   




Once again there does not exist enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis in 
total (chi-squared = 2.079, df =1, p = .149), nor in partial analysis. Table 21 shows the 
results of a reelection year analysis. When holding for a reelection year instead of an 
election year there is still not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis as is seen 
below in the chi-square test for fit. Lastly knowing if being in a battleground state has 
any bearing on the findings the variable was added. When running the tests the findings, 
shown in Table 22, even in partial analysis, did not demonstrate any evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis. 
In Summary, all tests run holding for president’s party and that of HM being 
approved there was not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
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alternative. There appears to be no potential for bias based on these findings within 
 
FEMA Hazard Mitigation aid. 
 
In answering the 4 research questions there is not enough evidence to reject the 
first 3 null hypotheses. Were HM the only type of FEMA aid, then there does not exist 
enough evidence in the data set to reject the null hypothesis, nor does the data in base 





Presidents Party * HM Granted * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 Chi- 
 Square Tests   
Decision Falls In Reelection Year Governors Party Value  df  Asymp. Sig. (2- 




1.244 1 .265 
 Square   
Continuity 
.988 1 .320 




.612 1 .434 
 Square   
Continuity 
.469 1 .493 
  Correction   
No 
Pearson Chi- 
.011 1 .916 





.000 1 1.000 




2.255 1 .133 
 Square   
Continuity 






Pearson Chi-  
.067 1 .795 
 
Democratic 
 Square   
Continuity 
.000 1 1.000 







2.821 1 .093 
 Square   
Continuity 
1.905 1 .167 
  Correction   
Pearson Chi- 
. 





Pearson Chi-  
.844 1 .358 





.500 1 .480 




.786 1 .375 
 Square   
Continuity 
.599 1 .439 




.924 1 .337 
 Square   
Continuity 
.756 1 .385 
 
Total 
  Correction   
Pearson Chi- 
.394 1 .530 





.057 1 .811 




2.079   1 .149 
 Square   
Continuity 
1.885   1 .170 
  Correction   
Decision Falls In 
Reelection Year 
Before Nov 4 
















  V   
  N of Valid Cases  453   











  V   
 
  N of Valid Cases  533   
No 





  V   
  N of Valid Cases  24   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  1010   














N of Valid Cases 91 









  V   
  N of Valid Cases  103   
Nominal by 
Phi 
Independent  Nominal   
  N of Valid Cases    7    







  V   














  V   
  N of Valid Cases   544    










  V   
  N of Valid Cases    636    








  V   
  N of Valid Cases    31    







  V   





Presidents Party * HM Granted * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 * 






Decision Falls In Reelection Year 
 
Before Nov 4 













1.195    1 .274 
 
 






















.612 1 .434 
 
 
.469 1 .493 
 
 
.011 1 .916 
 
 














2.200    1 .138 
 
 












.104 1 .747 
 
 


















3.174    1 .075 
 
 



















.786 1 .375 
 
 
















.731 1 .392 
 
 
















.932 1 .334 
 
 












.394 1 .530 
 
 













1.971   1 .160 
 
 

























































.014    1 .906 
 
 
.000    1 1.000 
 
 
.060    1 .807 
 
 












.113    1 .737 
 
 















.049    1 .825 
 
 
















.060    1 .807 
 
 












.185    1 .667 
 
 













1.244   1 .265 
 
 
















.612    1 .434 
 
 












.011    1 .916 
 
 














2.255   1 .133 
 
 






























2.821   1 .093 
 
 


















.844    1 .358 
 
 












.786    1 .375 
 
 































.924    1 .337 
 
 
.756    1 .385 
 
 
.394    1 .530 
 
 












2.079   1 .149 
 
 






Decision Falls In Reelection Year 
 
Before Nov 4 















































































































































































































N of Valid Cases 1177 
 
 









































































































































































N of Valid Cases 533 
 
































































































































N of Valid Cases 636 
 





























It was earlier shown that there appeared to be no association between the 
president’s party and IA being granted. Yet it was important to know if the party of the 
requesting governor’s played an additional relationship to how IA was approved or 
denied. Table 24 demonstrates the breakdown of IA being approved or turned down 
based on the president’s party and the party of the requesting governor. 
IA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When IA aid was granted from 1996- 
 
2012 it was done 493 times. Of those 493 times Republican governors asked for aid a 
 
Republican president for IA aid 278 times and asked a Democratic president for IA aid 
 
358 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted HM by Republican 
presidents 104 times or 37.4% of the time and they were granted IA by Democratic 
presidents 149 times or 41.6% of the time. There existed a 4.2% disparity, with 
Democratic presidents granting aid more often to Republican governors than Republican 
presidents did. 
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No Yes  






Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party Crosstabulation   
 















Democratic  Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  55.6%  45.1%  51.1%   
 
% of Total 31.8% 19.3% 51.1% 
 
 Count  138  128  266   
 





51.9% 48.1% 100.0% 
 Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  44.4%  54.9%  48.9%   
 
% of Total 25.4% 23.5% 48.9% 
Count   311  233   544 
% within presidents 
 
Total 
57.2% 42.8% 100.0% 
 Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  100.0%    100.0%    100.0%   
 
% of Total 57.2% 42.8% 100.0% 
Count   209  149  358 


























58.4% 41.6% 100.0% 
 Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  54.6%  58.9%  56.3%   
 
% of Total 32.9% 23.4% 56.3% 
 
 Count  174  104  278   
 
% within presidents 
62.6% 37.4% 100.0% 
 Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  45.4%  41.1%  43.7%   
 
% of Total 27.4% 16.4% 43.7% 
Count 383 253 636 
 
Total 
% within presidents  
60.2% 39.8% 100.0% 
 Party   
 





% of Total 60.2% 39.8% 100.0% 
Count 17 4 21 











Democratic  Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  70.8%  57.1%  67.7%   
 
% of Total 54.8% 12.9% 67.7% 
 
 Count  7  3  10   
 




70.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
 Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  29.2%  42.9%  32.3%   
 
% of Total 22.6% 9.7% 32.3% 
Count  24  7  31 
% within presidents 
 
Total 
77.4% 22.6% 100.0% 
 Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  100.0%    100.0%    100.0%   
 
% of Total 77.4% 22.6% 100.0% 
Count   399  258  657 









60.7% 39.3% 100.0% 
 Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  55.6%  52.3%  54.3%   
 
% of Total 32.9% 21.3% 54.3% 
 
 Count  319  235  554   
 




57.6% 42.4% 100.0% 
 Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  44.4%  47.7%  45.7%   
 
% of Total 26.3% 19.4% 45.7% 
Count   718  493  1211 
% within presidents 
 
Total 
59.3% 40.7% 100.0% 
 Party   
 
 % within IA Granted  100.0%    100.0%    100.0%   
 
% of Total 59.3% 40.7% 100.0% 
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In addition, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for IA aid 278 
times and asked a Republic president for IA aid 266 times. Democratic governors were 
granted aid by Democratic presidents 105 times or 37.8% while they were granted IA aid 
by Republican presidents 128 times or 48.1%. This goes against the idea of like party 
affiliation being a deciding factor for granting IA aid. 
Lastly, Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for IA aid 21 times 
and asked a Republican president for IA aid 10 times. Independent governors were granted 
aid by Democratic presidents 4 times or 19.0% while they were granted IA aid by 
Republican presidents 3 times or 30%. 
When looking at Table 24, as a whole there is not enough evidence for a 
presumption against the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
relationship between the president’s party and IA being approved influenced by the 
governor’s party (chi-square = 1.235, df = 1, p= .266). Furthermore, when looking at 
partial analysis one finds that if the party of the requesting governor is Independent then 
there is no relationship between the president’s Party and IA being approved (chi-square 
= .465, df = 1, p= .495) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis. Additionally, 
if the party of the requesting governor is Republican, than we must assume there is no 
relationship to IA being approved and the party of the president (chi-square = 
.1.158, df = 1, p= .282) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis. However, 
looking at additional partial analysis one finds that’s if the party of the requesting 
governor is Democratic, then there is a strong presumption against the null hypothesis 
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when looking at the relationship between the president’s Party and IA being approved 
 
(chi-square = .5.947, df = 1, p= .015). 
 
The next logical progression was to see if there remained any potential association 
when an added variable was added, that of it being an election year. The following cross 
tabulation table demonstrates the breakdown of IA being approved or turned down based 







 Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party Chi-Square Tests   
Governors Party Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- 
  sided)   
 Pearson Chi-Square  5.947  1  .015   
Democratic 
  Continuity Correction  5.532 1 .019 
 Pearson Chi-Square  1.158  1  .282   
Republican 
  Continuity Correction  .989  1  .320   
 Pearson Chi-Square  .465 1 .495 
Independent 
  Continuity Correction  .049  1  .824   
 Pearson Chi-Square  1.235  1  .266   
Total 
  Continuity Correction  1.108 1 .293 
 Governors Party  Value  Approx. Sig.   
 Phi  .105  .015   
 
Democratic 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .105 .015 
  N of Valid Cases  544   
 Phi  -.043  .282   
 
Republican 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .043 .282 
  N of Valid Cases  636   
 Phi  .122  .495   
 
Independent 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .122 .495 
  N of Valid Cases  31   
 Phi  .032  .266   
 
Total 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .032 .266 






Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 
 4 Crosstabulation   
Decision Falls 
In Election Year 
governors Party   IA Granted    Total 
No Yes 
 Before Nov 4   




63.0% 37.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
58.2% 45.3% 52.7% 




  % of Total  33.2%    19.5%    52.7%   






50.3% 49.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
41.8% 54.7% 47.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  23.8% 23.5% 47.3% 




57.0% 43.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  57.0%   43.0%  100.0% 










57.5% 42.5%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
54.9% 59.0% 56.6% 
 Granted   
Republican  
Party 
  % of Total  32.5%    24.1%    56.6%   
 Count  123  77  200   
% within 
61.5% 38.5%   100.0% 
Republican  presidents Party   
% within IA 
Granted 






% of Total 26.7% 16.7% 43.4% 




59.2% 40.8%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  59.2%   40.8%  100.0% 




92.9% 7.1% 100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
72.2% 25.0% 63.6% 




  % of Total  59.1%     4.5%     63.6%   






62.5% 37.5%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
27.8% 75.0% 36.4% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  22.7% 13.6% 36.4% 




81.8% 18.2%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  81.8%   18.2%  100.0% 














60.9% 39.1%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
57.0% 52.2% 55.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  33.5%    21.5%    55.0%   
 Count  222  173  395   
Republican % within 
presidents Party 
 






% within IA  
43.0% 47.8% 45.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  25.3% 19.7% 45.0% 




58.8% 41.2%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  58.8%   41.2%  100.0% 




60.0% 40.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
48.8% 44.4% 47.0% 




  % of Total  28.2%    18.8%    47.0%   






55.7% 44.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
51.2% 55.6% 53.0% 




  % of Total  29.5% 23.5% 53.0% 




57.7% 42.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  57.7%   42.3%  100.0% 










60.8% 39.2%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
53.6% 58.5% 55.4% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  33.7%    21.7%    55.4%   





% within  
65.4% 34.6%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
46.4% 41.5% 44.6% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  29.1% 15.4% 44.6% 




62.9% 37.1%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  62.9%   37.1%  100.0% 




57.1% 42.9%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
66.7%   100.0%   77.8% 




  % of Total  44.4%    33.3%    77.8%   






100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
33.3% 0.0% 22.2% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  22.2% 0.0% 22.2% 




66.7% 33.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  66.7%   33.3%  100.0% 








60.3% 39.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
52.0% 52.7% 52.3% 
 Granted   











61.0% 39.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
48.0% 47.3% 47.7% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  29.1%    18.6%    47.7%   




60.7% 39.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  60.7% 39.3%   100.0% 




62.2% 37.8%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
55.6% 45.1% 51.1% 




  % of Total  31.8%    19.3%    51.1%   






51.9% 48.1%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
44.4% 54.9% 48.9% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  25.4%    23.5%    48.9%   




57.2% 42.8%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   









58.4% 41.6%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
54.6% 58.9% 56.3% 




  % of Total  32.9%    23.4%    56.3%   






62.6% 37.4%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
45.4% 41.1% 43.7% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  27.4% 16.4% 43.7% 




60.2% 39.8%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  60.2%   39.8%  100.0% 




81.0% 19.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
70.8% 57.1% 67.7% 




  % of Total  54.8%    12.9%    67.7%   






70.0% 30.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
29.2% 42.9% 32.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  22.6% 9.7% 32.3% 




77.4% 22.6%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   








60.7% 39.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
55.6% 52.3% 54.3% 




  % of Total  32.9%    21.3%    54.3%   






57.6% 42.4%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
44.4% 47.7% 45.7% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  26.3% 19.4% 45.7% 




59.3% 40.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   




As is demonstrated above in both Table 25 and 26, IA was approved or denied in 
 
1211 cases. When IA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 493 times. IA was 
requested during a presidential election year 333 times and was approved 131 times or 
39.3%. Republican governors asked a Republican president for IA aid during an election 
year 78 times and asked a Democratic president for IA aid 97 times. In that set of data, 
Republican governors were granted IA by Republican presidents 27 times or 34.6% of the 
time and they were granted IA by Democratic presidents 38 times or 39.2% of the time. 
There existed a 4.6% disparity, with Democratic presidents granting aid more often to 
Republican governors than Republican presidents did. 
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In addition, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for IA during a 
presidential election year aid 70 times and asked a Republic president for IA aid 79 times. 
Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 28 times or 40.0% 
while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 35 times or 44.3%. 
 
Lastly Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for IA during a 
presidential election year aid 7 times and asked a Republican president for IA aid 2 times. 
Independent governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 3 times or 42.9% 
while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 0 times or 0%.. 
 
When looking at Table 28, as a whole, there once again is not enough evidence to 
form a presumption against the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
relationship between the president’s party and IA being approved influenced by the 
governor’s party during a presidential election year (chi-square = .015, df = 1, p= .902). 
Furthermore, when looking at partial analysis one finds that if the party of the requesting 
governor is Independent then there is no relationship between the president’s Party during 
a presidential election year and IA being approved (chi-square = 1.286, df = 1, p= .257) 
and find no presumption against the null hypothesis. Lastly if the party of the requesting 
governor is Republican, than we must assume there is no relationship to IA being approved 
and the party of the president during a presidential election year (chi-square = 






Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 
 4 Chi-Square Tests   
Decision Falls In Election Year Governors Party Value  df   Asymp. Sig. (2- 




6.492 1 .011 
 Square   
Continuity 
5.984 1 .014 




.761 1 .383 
 Square   
Continuity 
.603 1 .437 
  Correction   
No 
Pearson Chi- 
3.154 1 .076 





1.443 1 .230 




1.953 1 .162 
 Square   
Continuity 
1.765 1 .184 




.282 1 .596 
 Square   
Continuity 
.133 1 .715 






.385 1 .535 
 Square   
Continuity 
.214 1 .643 




1.286 1 .257 
 Square   
Continuity 






Pearson Chi-  
.015 1 .902 
 
Total 
 Square   
Continuity 
.000 1 .991 




5.947 1 .015 
 Square   
Continuity 
5.532 1 .019 




1.158 1 .282 
 Square   
Continuity 
.989 1 .320 
 
Total 
  Correction   
Pearson Chi- 
.465 1 .495 





.049 1 .824 




1.235 1 .266 
 Square   
Continuity 
1.108 1 .293 
  Correction   
Decision Falls In Election Governors Party Value Approx. 
 Year Before Nov 4  Sig.   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  395   











  V   
  N of Valid Cases  461   









  V   






Nominal by Nominal 
Phi .047 .162 
Total   Cramer's V  .047  .162   
  N of Valid Cases  878   
 Phi  .043  .596   
 
Democratic 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .043  .596   
  N of Valid Cases  149   
 Phi  -.047    .535   
 
Republican 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .047  .535   
 
Yes 
  N of Valid Cases  175   
 
 Phi  -.378    .257   
Nominal by Nominal 
Independent   Cramer's V  .378  .257   
  N of Valid Cases  9   
 Phi  -.007    .902   
 
Total 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .007  .902   
  N of Valid Cases  333   
 Phi  .105  .015   
 
Democratic 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .105  .015   
  N of Valid Cases  544   
 Phi  -.043    .282   
 
Republican 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .043  .282   
 
Total 
  N of Valid Cases  636   
 
 Phi  .122  .495   
Nominal by Nominal 
Independent   Cramer's V  .122  .495   
  N of Valid Cases  31   
 Phi  .032  .266   
 
Total 
Nominal by Nominal 
  Cramer's V  .032  .266   
N of Valid Cases 1211 
Interestingly, when looking at additional partial analysis one finds that if the party 
of the requesting governor is Democratic during a non-election year, then there is a very 
strong presumption against the null hypothesis when looking at the relationship between 
the president’s Party and IA being turned down (chi-square = 6.492, df = 1, p= .011). The 






Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before 
 Nov 4 Crosstabulation   
 
Decision Falls In 
Reelection Year 
 
Governors Party      IA Granted      Total 
 
No Yes 
 Before Nov 4       







% within IA 
Granted 
63.3% 36.7%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 31.6% 18.3% 49.9% 








53.7% 46.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
 
% within IA 
46.0% 55.9% 50.1% 
 Granted   
 
% of Total 26.9% 23.2% 50.1% 
Count 265 188 453 
% within  
58.5% 41.5%   100.0% 
No 
Total 
 presidents Party   
 
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
 
  % of Total  58.5%   41.5%  100.0% 














% within IA 
Granted 
56.3% 43.8%   100.0% 
 
 
50.8% 58.9% 54.0% 
Republican  
Party 
  % of Total  30.4%   23.6%   54.0%  
 
 Count  157  88  245   
 
% within 
64.1% 35.9%   100.0% 
Republican   presidents Party    
 
% within IA 
 
Granted 






% of Total 29.5% 16.5% 46.0% 




59.8% 40.2%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  59.8%   40.2%  100.0% 




93.3% 6.7% 100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
70.0% 25.0% 62.5% 




  % of Total  58.3%     4.2%     62.5%   






66.7% 33.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
30.0% 75.0% 37.5% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  25.0% 12.5% 37.5% 




83.3% 16.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  83.3%   16.7%  100.0% 














60.3% 39.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
52.8% 51.7% 52.4% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  31.6%    20.8%    52.4%   
 Count  285  196  481   
Republican % within 
presidents Party 
 






% within IA  
47.2% 48.3% 47.6% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  28.2% 19.4% 47.6% 




59.8% 40.2%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  59.8%   40.2%  100.0% 




57.7% 42.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
65.2% 48.9% 57.1% 




  % of Total  33.0%    24.2%    57.1%   






41.0% 59.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
34.8% 51.1% 42.9% 




  % of Total  17.6% 25.3% 42.9% 




50.5% 49.5%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  50.5%   49.5%  100.0% 










67.1% 32.9%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
73.4% 59.0% 68.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  45.6%    22.3%    68.0%   





% within  
51.5% 48.5%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
26.6% 41.0% 32.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  16.5% 15.5% 32.0% 




62.1% 37.9%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  62.1%   37.9%  100.0% 




50.0% 50.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
75.0%   100.0%   85.7% 




  % of Total  42.9%    42.9%    85.7%   






100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
25.0% 0.0% 14.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  14.3% 0.0% 14.3% 




57.1% 42.9%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  57.1%   42.9%  100.0% 








62.5% 37.5%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
70.2% 55.2% 63.7% 
 Granted   









46.6% 53.4%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
29.8% 44.8% 36.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  16.9%    19.4%    36.3%   




56.7% 43.3%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  56.7% 43.3%   100.0% 




62.2% 37.8%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
55.6% 45.1% 51.1% 




  % of Total  31.8%    19.3%    51.1%   






51.9% 48.1%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
44.4% 54.9% 48.9% 
 Granted   
Total   % of Total  25.4%    23.5%    48.9%   




57.2% 42.8%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  57.2% 42.8%   100.0% 






58.4% 41.6%   100.0% 
Democratic  presidents Party   
% within IA 
Granted 






% of Total 32.9% 23.4% 56.3% 




62.6% 37.4%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
45.4% 41.1% 43.7% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  27.4%    16.4%    43.7%   




60.2% 39.8%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  60.2%   39.8%  100.0% 




81.0% 19.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
70.8% 57.1% 67.7% 
 Granted   
Presidents 
Party 
  % of Total  54.8% 12.9% 67.7% 






70.0% 30.0%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
29.2% 42.9% 32.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  22.6%     9.7%     32.3%   




77.4% 22.6%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  77.4%   22.6%  100.0% 


















% within IA  
55.6% 52.3% 54.3% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  32.9% 21.3% 54.3% 




57.6% 42.4%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
44.4% 47.7% 45.7% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  26.3%    19.4%    45.7%   




59.3% 40.7%   100.0% 
 presidents Party   
% within IA 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 Granted   
  % of Total  59.3% 40.7%   100.0% 
 
 
As before, IA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. Table 29 clearly shows that 
when IA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 493 times. IA was requested 
during a presidential reelection year 201 times and was approved 87 times or 43.3%. 
Republican governors asked a Republican president for IA aid during a reelection year 33 
times and asked a Democratic president for IA aid 70 times. In that set of data, 
Republican governors were granted IA by Republican presidents 17 times or 51.5% of 
the time and they were granted IA by Democratic presidents 47 times or 67.1% of the 
time. There existed a 15.6% disparity, with Democratic presidents granting aid more 
often to Republican governors than Republican presidents did. 
In addition, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for IA during a 
presidential reelection year aid 52 times and asked a Republic president for IA aid 39 
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times. Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 30 times or 
 
57.7% while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 16 times or 41.0%. 
 
Finally Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for IA during a 
presidential reelection year aid 6 times and asked a Republican president for IA aid 1 
times. Independent governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 3 times or 
60.0% while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 1 times or 100%. Once 
again, relatively low number of requests by Independent governors makes this visual 
statistical difference not necessarily significant due to the small sample size. 
Table 30 demonstrates the chi square values of the decision falling during a 
reelection year, the party of the president, the Party of the governor and if IA was 
granted. As a whole the null hypothesis can be rejected. The null hypothesis is that there 
is no relationship between the president’s party and IA being approved, influenced by the 
governor’s party, during a presidential reelection year (chi-square = 1.235, df = 1, p= 
.266). Yet as was noted before, partial analysis reveals that when IA was granted to 
Democratic governors there appeared to be strong evidence against the null hypothesis, 
thus favoring the alternative (chi-square = 5.947, df = 1, p = .015). In addition, when IA 
was approved during reelection years there exits strong evidence against null in favor of 
the alternative (chi-square = 4.802, df = 1, p = .028). It should be noted that approval of 
IA during non-reelection years did not reject the null hypothesis (chi-square = .116, df = 
1, p = .734). This lends further credence to the hypothesis that reelection years may bias 
 
FEMA aid dispensation, specifically as it applies to IA. 
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The last test in this line of reasoning adds the value of a battleground State as is 




Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before 
 Nov Chi-Square Tests   
Decision Falls In Reelection Year 
Before Nov 4 
Governors Party Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 




4.236 1 .040 
 Square   
Continuity 
3.853 1 .050 




3.379 1 .066 
 Square   
Continuity 
3.061 1 .080 
  Correction   
No 
Pearson Chi- 
2.880 1 .090 





1.280 1 .258 




.116 1 .734 
 Square   
Continuity 
.076 1 .783 




2.476 1 .116 
 Square   
Continuity 
1.855 1 .173 
 
Yes 
  Correction   
Pearson Chi- 
2.328 1 .127 












Pearson Chi-  
.875 1 .350 
 
Independent 
 Square   
 
Continuity 
.000 1 1.000 






4.802 1 .028 
 Square   
 
Continuity 
4.175 1 .041 






5.947 1 .015 
 Square   
 
Continuity 
5.532 1 .019 






1.158 1 .282 
 Square   
 
Continuity 
.989 1 .320 
 
Total 
  Correction   
 
Pearson Chi- 
.465 1 .495 





.049 1 .824 






1.235 1 .266 
 Square   
 
Continuity 
1.108 1 .293 
  Correction   
 
Decision Falls In 
Reelection Year Before 
 
Governors Party Value Approx. Sig. 
Nov 4   
 
 Phi  .097  .040   
 
Democratic 
Nominal by Nominal  
Cramer's V .097 .040 
 
N of Valid Cases 453 
 
Phi -.080 .066 
No 
Republican 
Nominal by Nominal  
Cramer's V .080 .066 
 
N of Valid Cases 533 
 
Phi .346 .090 
Independent Nominal by Nominal  
Cramer's V .346 .090 
(Continues) 
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Total  Cramer's V .011 .734 
 N of Valid Cases  1010  
  Phi .165 .116 
Democratic Nominal by Nominal 





N of Valid Cases 24 
 
Phi .011 .734 










N of Valid Cases 91 
 
Phi .150 .127 
 
Republican 
Nominal by Nominal  
Cramer's V .150 .127 
 
N of Valid Cases 103 
 
Phi -.354 .350 
 
Independent 
Nominal by Nominal  
Cramer's V .354 .350 
 
N of Valid Cases 7 
 
Phi .155 .028 
 
Total 
Nominal by Nominal  
Cramer's V .155 .028 
 
N of Valid Cases 201 
 
Phi .105 .015 
 
Democratic 
Nominal by Nominal  
Cramer's V .105 .015 
 
N of Valid Cases 544 
 
Phi -.043 .282 
 
Republican 
Nominal by Nominal  









N of Valid Cases 636 
 
 Phi  .122  .495   
Nominal by Nominal 
Cramer's V .122 .495 
 
N of Valid Cases 31 
 
Phi .032 .266 
 
Total 
Nominal by Nominal  
Cramer's V .032 .266 
 






Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year 










Before Nov 4 
 

















63.3% 36.7%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 31.6% 18.4% 50.0% 

















53.5% 46.5%   100.0% 
 
 
45.8% 55.9% 50.0% 
 
% of Total 26.8% 23.2% 50.0% 
 
















58.4% 41.6%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 58.4% 41.6%   100.0% 
 




















56.3% 43.8%   100.0% 
 
 
50.8% 58.9% 54.0% 
Republican  
Party 
% of Total 30.4% 23.6% 54.0% 
 








64.1% 35.9%   100.0% 
 



























100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 59.8% 40.2%   100.0% 
 













93.3% 6.7% 100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 58.3% 4.2% 62.5% 

















66.7% 33.3%   100.0% 
 
 
30.0% 75.0% 37.5% 
 
% of Total 25.0% 12.5% 37.5% 
 













83.3% 16.7%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 83.3% 16.7%   100.0% 
 
























60.3% 39.7%   100.0% 
 
 
52.9% 51.7% 52.4% 
 
% of Total 31.6% 20.8% 52.4% 
 









59.2% 40.8%   100.0% 




47.1% 48.3% 47.6% 
 
% of Total 28.1% 19.4% 47.6% 
 













59.8% 40.2%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 

















58.7% 41.3%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 34.6% 24.4% 59.0% 












% within IA 
 
 
43.8% 56.3%   100.0% 
 
 
34.1% 48.6% 41.0% 
Yes  Granted   
 
% of Total 17.9% 23.1% 41.0% 
 













52.6% 47.4%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 













Count 36 20 56 
 
% within 










70.6% 62.5% 67.5% 
 
% of Total 43.4% 24.1% 67.5% 
 













55.6% 44.4%   100.0% 
 
 
29.4% 37.5% 32.5% 
 
% of Total 18.1% 14.5% 32.5% 
 













61.4% 38.6%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 61.4% 38.6%   100.0% 
 




















50.0% 50.0%   100.0% 
 
 




% of Total 42.9% 42.9% 85.7% 
 













100.0%    0.0% 100.0% 
 
 
25.0% 0.0% 14.3% 
 
% of Total 14.3% 0.0% 14.3% 
 













57.1% 42.9%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 

















61.1% 38.9%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 39.3% 25.0% 64.3% 

















50.0% 50.0%   100.0% 
 
 
31.3% 41.7% 35.7% 
 
% of Total 17.9% 17.9% 35.7% 
 













57.1% 42.9%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 57.1% 42.9%   100.0% 
 



























62.5% 37.5%   100.0% 
 
 
55.7% 45.3% 51.3% 


















44.3% 54.7%    48.7% 
 
% of Total 25.5% 23.2%    48.7% 
 







57.5% 42.5%   100.0% 




100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 57.5% 42.5%   100.0% 
 













57.6% 42.4%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 32.1% 23.7% 55.8% 

















63.2% 36.8%   100.0% 
 
 
46.5% 40.7% 44.2% 
 
% of Total 27.9% 16.2% 44.2% 
 













60.1% 39.9%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 60.1% 39.9%   100.0% 
 













81.0% 19.0%   100.0% 
 
 








% of Total 54.8% 12.9% 67.7% 













70.0% 30.0%   100.0% 
 
 
29.2% 42.9% 32.3% 
 














77.4% 22.6%   100.0% 




100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 77.4% 22.6%   100.0% 
 













60.4% 39.6%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 32.7% 21.4% 54.1% 

















58.1% 41.9%   100.0% 
 
 
44.9% 47.3% 45.9% 
 
% of Total 26.7% 19.2% 45.9% 
 













59.4% 40.6%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 59.4% 40.6%   100.0% 
 




























% of Total 100.0% 100.0% 
 














% of Total 100.0% 100.0% 
 

















































% of Total 100.0% 100.0% 
 













50.0%    50.0%   100.0% 
 
 











% of Total 23.1%    23.1% 46.2% 







% within IA 
Granted 
28.6%    71.4%   100.0% 
 
 
40.0%    62.5% 53.8% 
 




















100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 38.5% 61.5%   100.0% 
 













78.6% 21.4%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 55.0% 15.0% 70.0% 
















33.3% 66.7%   100.0% 
 
 
15.4% 57.1% 30.0% 
 
% of Total 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 
 








65.0% 35.0%   100.0% 








% of Total 65.0% 35.0%   100.0% 
 













70.0% 30.0%   100.0% 
 
 








% of Total 42.4% 18.2% 60.6% 













30.8% 69.2%   100.0% 
 
 
22.2% 60.0% 39.4% 
 

















54.5% 45.5%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 54.5% 45.5%   100.0% 
 













50.0% 50.0%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 21.4% 21.4% 42.9% 












% within IA 
 
 
37.5% 62.5%   100.0% 
 
 
50.0% 62.5% 57.1% 
Total  Granted   
 
% of Total 21.4% 35.7% 57.1% 
 













42.9% 57.1%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 













Count 11 3 14 
 
% within 





% within IA  
84.6%    42.9% 70.0% 
 Granted  
 























33.3% 66.7%   100.0% 




15.4% 57.1% 30.0% 
 
% of Total 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 
 













65.0% 35.0%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 65.0% 35.0%   100.0% 
 













70.0% 30.0%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 41.2% 17.6% 58.8% 

















35.7% 64.3%   100.0% 
 
 
26.3% 60.0% 41.2% 
 
% of Total 14.7% 26.5% 41.2% 
 













55.9% 44.1%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 55.9% 44.1%   100.0% 
 






















63.3% 36.7%   100.0% 
 
 
54.0% 44.1% 49.9% 
 














53.7% 46.3%   100.0% 




46.0% 55.9% 50.1% 
 
% of Total 26.9% 23.2% 50.1% 
 













58.5% 41.5%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 58.5% 41.5%   100.0% 
 













56.3% 43.8%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 30.4% 23.6% 54.0% 

















64.1% 35.9%   100.0% 
 
 
49.2% 41.1% 46.0% 
 
% of Total 29.5% 16.5% 46.0% 
 













59.8% 40.2%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 


















93.3% 6.7%    100.0% 




70.0% 25.0% 62.5% 
 
% of Total 58.3% 4.2% 62.5% 
 













66.7% 33.3%   100.0% 
 
 
30.0% 75.0% 37.5% 
 

















83.3% 16.7%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 83.3% 16.7%   100.0% 
 













60.3% 39.7%   100.0% 
 
 











% of Total 31.6% 20.8% 52.4% 







% within IA 
Granted 
59.3% 40.7%   100.0% 
 
 
47.2% 48.3% 47.6% 
 




















100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 59.8% 40.2%   100.0% 
 













57.7% 42.3%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 33.0% 24.2% 57.1% 
















41.0% 59.0%   100.0% 
 
 
34.8% 51.1% 42.9% 
 
% of Total 17.6% 25.3% 42.9% 
 








50.5% 49.5%   100.0% 








% of Total 50.5% 49.5%   100.0% 
 













67.1% 32.9%   100.0% 
 
 








% of Total 45.6% 22.3% 68.0% 













51.5% 48.5%   100.0% 
 
 
26.6% 41.0% 32.0% 
 

















62.1% 37.9%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 62.1% 37.9%   100.0% 
 













50.0% 50.0%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 42.9% 42.9% 85.7% 

















100.0%    0.0% 100.0% 
 
 
25.0% 0.0% 14.3% 
 
% of Total 14.3% 0.0% 14.3% 
 













57.1% 42.9%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 













Count 80 48 128 
 
% within 









70.2%    55.2% 63.7% 
 
% of Total 39.8%    23.9% 63.7% 
 






46.6% 53.4%   100.0% 
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29.8% 44.8% 36.3% 
 
% of Total 16.9% 19.4% 36.3% 
 













56.7% 43.3%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 56.7% 43.3%   100.0% 
 













62.2% 37.8%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 31.8% 19.3% 51.1% 

















51.9% 48.1%   100.0% 
 
 
44.4% 54.9% 48.9% 
 

















57.2% 42.8%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 57.2% 42.8%   100.0% 
 
























58.4% 41.6%   100.0% 
 
 
54.6% 58.9% 56.3% 
 
% of Total 32.9% 23.4% 56.3% 
 







62.6% 37.4%   100.0% 




45.4% 41.1% 43.7% 
 
% of Total 27.4% 16.4% 43.7% 
 













60.2% 39.8%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 60.2% 39.8%   100.0% 
 













81.0% 19.0%   100.0% 
 
 





% of Total 54.8% 12.9% 67.7% 

















70.0% 30.0%   100.0% 
 
 
29.2% 42.9% 32.3% 
 
% of Total 22.6% 9.7% 32.3% 
 













77.4% 22.6%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
% of Total 77.4% 22.6%   100.0% 
 






















60.7% 39.3%   100.0% 
 
 
55.6% 52.3% 54.3% 
 



















57.6% 42.4%   100.0% 
 
 
44.4% 47.7% 45.7% 
 










% within presidents 
 
Party 




59.3% 40.7%   100.0% 
 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 




As has been noted, IA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When IA aid was 
granted from 1996-2012 it was done 493 times. IA was requested during a presidential 
reelection year in a battleground state 33 times and was approved 18 times or 54.4%. 
Republican governors asked a Republican president for IA aid during a reelection year in 
a battleground state 6 times and asked a Democratic president for IA aid 14 times. In that 
set of data, Republican governors were granted IA by Republican presidents 2 times or 
33.3% of the time and they were granted IA by Democratic presidents 11 times or 78.6% 
of the time. There existed a 45.3% disparity, with Democratic presidents granting aid 
more often to Republican governors than Republican presidents did. 
Lastly, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for IA aid during a 
presidential reelection year in a battleground state 6 times and asked a Republic president 
for IA aid 7 times. Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 3 
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times or 50.0% while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 2 times or 
 
28.6%. To understand the statistical significance the chi-square is once again listed below 
in Table 31 for full and partial analysis. 
Table 31 
 
Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls in Reelection Year 
Before Nov 4 * Electoral Battleground State Chi-Square Test 
 
 
Electoral Decision Falls In Reelection Governors Party Value  df   Asymp. Sig. (2- 







4.408   1 .036 
 
 
4.016   1 .045 





















3.379   1 .066 
 
 
3.061   1 .080 
 
 
2.880   1 .090 
 
 
1.280   1 .258 










.135 1 .713 
 
 
.092 1 .762 














1.691   1 .194 
 
 
1.144   1 .285 















Continuity Correction .275 1 .600 
 
Pearson Chi-Square .875 1 .350 






Pearson Chi-Square 1.944 1 .163 
  Continuity Correction  1.517  1  .218   
 















Continuity Correction 5.202 1 .023 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.041 1 .153 
 
Continuity Correction 1.811 1 .178 
 
Pearson Chi-Square .465 1 .495 
  Continuity Correction  .049  1  .824   
 
Pearson Chi-Square .636 1 .425 
Total  
Continuity Correction .545 1 .460 
 
Democratic Pearson Chi-Square . 
No 
  Total  Pearson Chi-Square  .   
 
Pearson Chi-Square .627 1 .429 
Democratic 
  Continuity Correction  .048  1  .826   
 










Continuity Correction 2.051 1 .152 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.891 1 .027 
  Continuity Correction  3.436  1  .064   
 
Pearson Chi-Square .219 1 .640 
Democratic 
  Continuity Correction  .000  1  1.000   
 






Continuity Correction 2.051 1 .152 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.927 1 .048 
  Continuity Correction  2.659  1  .103   
 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.236 1 .040 
Democratic 
  Continuity Correction  3.853  1  .050   
 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.379 1 .066 





Continuity Correction 3.061 1 .080 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.880 1 .090 
 








Pearson Chi-Square .116 1 .734 
  Continuity Correction  .076  1  .783   
 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.476 1 .116 
Yes Democratic  






Pearson Chi-Square 2.328 1 .127 
  Continuity Correction  1.711  1  .191   
 






Continuity Correction .000 1 1.000 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.802 1 .028 
  Continuity Correction  4.175  1  .041   
 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.947 1 .015 
Democratic 
  Continuity Correction  5.532  1  .019   
 






Continuity Correction .989 1 .320 
 
Pearson Chi-Square .465 1 .495 











1.235 1 .266 
 
 
1.108 1 .293 





Decision Falls In Reelection 
 
Year Before Nov 4 
 











Phi .099 .036 
 
Cramer's V .099 .036 
 












Phi -.080 .066 
 
Cramer's V .080 .066 
 









Phi .346 .090 
 















Phi .012 .713 
 
Cramer's V .012 .713 
 
 









Phi .147 .194 
 













Phi .084 .444 
 
















Cramer's V .354 .350 
 









Phi .108 .163 
 
Cramer's V .108 .163 
 









Phi .103 .018 
 
Cramer's V .103 .018 
 















  Cramer's V  .058     .153   
 








 Phi  .122    .495   
Cramer's V .122 .495 
 









Phi .023 .425 
 
Cramer's V .023 .425 
 















 Nominal   
 
















Phi .220 .429 
 
Cramer's V .220 .429 
 












Phi .435 .052 
 
Cramer's V .435 .052 
 









Phi .385 .027 
 
Cramer's V .385 .027 
 










Phi .125 .640 
 
Cramer's V .125 .640 
 












Phi .435 .052 
 
Cramer's V .435 .052 
 









Phi .340 .048 
 
Cramer's V .340 .048 
 









Phi .097 .040 
 

















Cramer's V .080 .066 
 











Phi .346 .090 
 
Cramer's V .346 .090 
 









Phi .011 .734 
 
Cramer's V .011 .734 
 
 









Phi .165 .116 
 
Cramer's V .165 .116 
 









Phi .150 .127 
 

















  Cramer's V  .354     .350   
 









Phi .155 .028 
 
Cramer's V .155 .028 
 










Phi .105 .015 
 
Cramer's V .105 .015 
 









Phi -.043 .282 
 












Phi .122 .495 
 
Cramer's V .122 .495 
 
  N of Valid Cases  31   
 









  N of Valid Cases  1211   
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As is noted in the Chi-Square test for fit in Table 31, when looking at IA granted 
during a reelection year in a battleground state, that partial analysis finds that when it is 
not a battleground state governed by a Democratic governor there is strong evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (chi square = 5.610, df = 1, p = .018) 
even in non-reelection years. When IA requests fell in a battleground state, regardless of 
the governors party affiliation, or if in a reelection year, there existed enough evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (chi square = 3.927, df = 1, p = .048). 
What remains striking is that partial analysis reveals that whether or not the IA approval 
occurred in a battleground state, or governors party affiliation, that falling in a reelection 
year was enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis and favor the alternative (chi- 
square = 4.802, df = 1, p = .028). Digging deeper into the partial analysis discounting the 
governors party affiliation but maintaining that IA was approved and that is was a 
battleground state, there again existed evidence to reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative (chi-square = 3.927, df = 1, p = .048). Holding for the full association when IA 
was granted during a reelection year in a battleground state, (but not breaking it down by 
governors party affiliation) there was enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis and 
accept the alternative (chi-square 4.891, df = 1, p = .027). It appears that IA approval is 
influenced by reelection year, presidential party affiliation, and battleground state. 
Table 31 further shows in partial analysis that when IA is approved being in an 
electoral battleground state during a reelection year there appears to be a potential 
association to presidential party affiliation (chi-square = 4.802, df = 1, p = .027) which 
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leads to the null hypothesis being rejected in favor of the alternative. However there 
appears to be a lack of evidence to reject the null hypothesis during non-reelection years 
in non-battleground states (chi-square = .135, df = 1, p =.713). 
In Summary, IA and presidential party affiliation show a statistical association by 
the data, the first being that if the requesting governor is Democratic in a non-electoral 
battleground state than approvals and turndowns remain statistically significant (chi 
square = 4.408, df =1, p = .036). Being a requesting Republican governor did not show 
similar relationships, except when it came to requesting aid during an election year (chi 
square = 7.080, df =1, p =.008). IA showed statistical significant comparisons at the 
election year level for approvals and at the reelection year level (chi-square = 4.822, df = 
1, p =.028 and chi-square = 4.802, df = 1, p = .028 respectively. 
 
In order to understand what may be occurring, it is important to look at the 
percentages from a layman’s eye. Looking at the percentages in approval and denials for 
these levels is important to putting a picture into place. Democratic presidents approved 
IA 39.3% of the time as a base line average. In non-election years they approved 37.0% 
to requesting Democratic governors, 40.0% during election years and 42.3% during 
reelection years and 50% in battleground States. Conversely they approved to requesting 
Republican governors 42.5% in non-election years, 39.2% in election years, 32.9% in 
reelection years and 21.4% in battleground States. While their ingroup favoring raised 
steadily their out-group declined as the presidential political economy increased. 
Republican presidents approved IA 42.4% as a base line. In non-election years 
they approved 38.5% to requesting Republican governors, 34.6% during election years, 
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48.5% in reelection years and 66.7% in battleground States. Conversely, they approved to 
requesting Democratic governors 49.7% in non-election years, 44.3% during election 
years, 59% during reelection years and 62.5% in battleground States. While there was a 
slight favoring of ingroups as the political economy increased, the same out-group 
propensity was not witnessed as with Democratic presidents suggesting either no bias 
existed or that they subscribed to Gaspar and Reeves (2011) assertions that when a 
president denies a FEMA relief request they are hurt at the polls while the requesting 
governor is rewarded, further placing more pressure on the president to approve requests 
out of self-interest. When looking at Republican approvals for Democratic governors 
requests one can see the overall percent rise to support this leaning suggesting bias might 
indeed have been at work. 
In Chapter 1, I theorized that a president could 
 
1. Act in a manner that favors self-interest with FEMA dispensation. 
 
2. Allocate resources to favor his collective (party) interests. 
 
3. Be notable during times when his discretionary powers would favor self 
 
(reelection years in election battleground states). 
 
As was previously noted, the theoretical construct was founded in the belief that 
psychological and social factors of Group Justification Bias and Social Identity theories 
play an active role in the approval and turndown decision making process of a sitting 
president. Since presidential discretionary powers are subjective by law, to assume that 
these constructs play little role in the outcome of a FEMA gubernatorial request would be 
to deny the power of political economy by the most powerful leader in the free world. 
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This was where bias and potential corruption were drawn into the study. Yet in every 
statistical test rendered in this study, in not one place could bias or corruption be 
demonstrated. At most there appeared to be some statistical associations between 
presidential party and PA approval in the given data set. The theory remains plausible, 
but this study could not answer the research question adequately in relation to bias. 
Trying to determine bias based on approvals and turndowns, associated p values 
from chi-square tests and related percentages proved to be too much for the data gathered 
and the tests run. Again, bias is the propensity to favor self or others. We do not know 
what each president was thinking, but the evidence does suggest the potential for the 
propensity to favor self/party at the expense of others. The evidence shows an association 
between presidential Party and PA approvals. As the potential to favor self and party 
grew from non-election, to election, to reelection years so too did both presidential parties 
increase their PA approval percentages during each of these time frames. At the same time 
to their out-group, or opposing party, there appeared to exist an inverse association to PA 
approvals and a noted percent increase in Turndowns during the same time frames. While 
HM proved to be awarded on criteria not related to presidential Party, from the data at 
hand determining how IA was awarded was inconclusive. Neither HM nor IA added to the 
ability to answer the 4 research questions without further data. It is what is done next with 
these findings that ultimately could yield positive change and additional insight. 
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The purpose of this study was to explore if, or to what degree it appears that US 
presidents acted in a potentially biased manner with the use of FEMA approvals during 
election years in election battleground states and/or if there was ingroup favoritism from 
1996-2012 within those same states and times. The data indicated a potential association 
between presidential Party and PA approvals. As the potential to favor self and party 
grew from nonelection, to election, to reelection years so too did both presidential Parties 
increase their PA approval percentages. At the same time to their outgroup, or opposing 
party, there appeared to exist an inverse association to PA approvals and a noted percent 
increase in Turndowns during the same time frame. 
While HM proved to be awarded on criteria not related to presidential Party, from 
the data at hand determining how IA was awarded was inconclusive. Neither HM nor IA 
added to the ability to answer the 4 research questions without further data. In every 
statistical test rendered in this study, in not one place could bias or corruption be 
demonstrated as that is not what a chi-square test for fit measures. At most there appeared 
to be some statistical associations between presidential party and PA approval in the 
given data set. The proposed theory that drove this study remains plausible, but this study 
could not answer the research question adequately. 
Interpretations of the Findings 
 
It is important to remember that FEMA allocation requires part chance, part 
recommendations, and part presidential discretionary power. The chance element occurs 
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when a natural disaster strikes a given state, for no one can know where or when a disaster 
will strike. The second aspect of chance occurs if it happens to hit in an area of the 
country that could potentially benefit the sitting president through their ability to look and 
act presidential, potentially gaining political points from those in the affected areas 
including supporting those down the ticket or harming those of the opposing party by 
denying them funding. While both the requesting governor and FEMA makes their own 
assessment, the former by saying the state does not have the resources or means to 
adequately handle the disaster alone and the latter by assessing if the claim is warranted. 
Yet for all the chance and recommendations that can occur in an election year, it is the 
discretionary power made by the president, potentially weighing their political economy 
that creates the data points in this research. Early in Chapter 1 I proposed a theoretical 
model that purported that a president could/would: 
1. Act in a manner that favors self-interest with FEMA dispensation. 
 
2. Allocate resources to favor his collective (party) interests. 
 
3. Be notable during times when his discretionary powers would favor self 
 
(reelection years in election battleground states). 
 
Using both visual methodology of comparing relative percent’s found in the 
presented the extensive chi-square analysis of the data in the accompanying Tables has 
yielded unexpected results. Take for example Hazard Mitigation, which are used to assist 
in implementing long-term hazard mitigation measures following a major disaster. At no 
point, even in partial analysis of the data set, did there appear to be any association 
between presidential party and hazard mitigation approval. Neither presidential party 
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affiliation (chi-square =2.079, df =1, p = .149), nor approvals during reelection years in 
battleground states (chi-square =.113, df =1, p = .737) yielded adequate evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis which stated that there was no association between presidential party 
affiliation and hazard mitigation approvals/turndowns. Thus far it appears the presidents 
have acted upon recommendations in a manner consistent with the public good. 
IA, or monies and program to persons to house, repair, replace, move, or other 
individual expenses due to a disaster awarded to an individual, showed mixed results as 
was demonstrated earlier. Individual assistance was turned down 59.3% during all years 
studied by both parties. It could be argued that if FEMA aid was being rendered to gain 
political support than individual assistance would be the one area to approve more than 
deny, yet as a whole this does not weigh out (chi-square =2.079, df =1, p = .149), 
However, this research does not hinge alone on a singular blanket statement and p value. 
It is through the partial analysis of IA that the researched yielded some interesting 
findings. The data revealed that if the party of the requesting governor was Democratic, 
then there was a strong presumption against the null hypothesis when looking at the 
relationship between the president’s party and IA being approved (chi-square = .5.947, df 
= 1, p= .015). So while the Party of the president alone did not demonstrate an IA 
association, when paired with the governor’s party, specifically a Democratic governor, a 
likely association was shown to exist. As had been previously shown in the data analysis, 
when looking at additional partial analysis it was discovered that if the party of the 
requesting governor was Democratic during a non-election year, then there was a very 
strong presumption against the null hypothesis when looking at the relationship between 
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the president’s Party and IA being turned down or approved (chi-square = 6.492, df = 1, 
 
p= .011). When narrowing it down even further and looking at reelection years as 
 
opposed to election years, there again appeared to be no presumption against the null, and 
yet looking at all nonreelection years once again showed the same presumption against 
the null for Democratic requesting governors (chi-square = 4.236, df = 1, p= .040). 
 
In regards to IA, while the initial hypothesis that a president would favor their own 
self-interest and their own party in times most ethically challenged did not demonstrate it 
as expected, valuable information suggesting some kind of association was shown. 
However, because IA did not seem to be awarded more often as the political economy 
rose, knowing the historical factors that occurred could help illuminate the relationship 
seen with Democratic governors during non-election years. One of the key notes is that 
Republican presidents awarded IA more often to Democratic governors than did 
Democratic presidents in non-election years. This effect is not explained in the data, and 
does not comply with the tested theoretical model, even though there appears to be a thus 
far unexplained association. 
Lastly Public Assistance was studied, and here is where the data followed 
expected theorized results. The PA monetary burden is not less than 75%, carried by the 
federal government, with the remaining amount carried by and decided by the state, and 
this can be a sizeable dollar award for States. PA was the one type of aid awarded the 
most as a percent of requests, 73.7%, and the one that showed a strong association 
between presidential party (chi-square = 7.960, df = 1, p= .005) and disaster approval. 
Further partial analysis showed that not all parties were the same, as Democratic 
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governor’s requests for PA showed a strong association to presidential party and their 
respective decision under all criteria, other than battleground state. 
Inparty favoring increased as the stakes for potential bias increased, with the 
Republican president showing a 69.9% overall base, 67.3% non-election, 88.9% reelection 
and 83.3% battleground state. Conversely, opposing party was based at 69.9%, 
75% non-election years, 73.2 reelection years and down to 64.3% in battleground States. 
The same pattern remained for Democratic presidents showing an overall 77.0% base, 
80.5% non-election, 82.6% reelection and 100% battleground state. The opposing party 
pattern remained at 71.7% non-election, 62.5% reelection year and 42.9% battleground 
state. Both examples showed an effect related to the potential political economic factors 
with a direct rise for ingroup and a direct drop for outgroup. The strength of p values 
throughout reflected the percentages. Remember bias cannot be proven using a chi- 
squared test for fit, only that an association may or may not exist and its relative strength. 
The data must be presented at face value, and allow a reasonable person to make the 
judgment call. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
 
When analyzing the study findings, it becomes clear that more information would 
have been beneficial in order to address some of the research questions, specifically the 
relationship of IA approvals/turndowns during nonelection years. It has to be 
remembered that all the data gathered were bivariate in relationship, and this was the 
design of the study. In hindsight other data could have helps answer lingering questions. 
Such data that would have been beneficial would have been the dollar amount awarded 
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per claim by FEMA, the population size affected per claim, the voter rolls of both pre and 
post disaster locations to compare electoral shift, complied similar data since FEMA’s 
inception for a more robust data sample specifically for battleground states, personal 
interviews with FEMA agents who established the reports for each president, personal 
interviews with governors on why aid was requested when it was, demographics data, 
and lastly interviews with each president to know if there was any political economy to 
their FEMA dispensation decisions. In addition, it has been just over 2 years since the 
data set used in this research was new and a new set of election data and subsequent 
FEMA requests exists for the intervening years which need to be examined for potential 
associations. 
This research has yielded new and valuable information to the discussion on 
associations between presidential party and the use of FEMA funds, specifically on 
approvals and turndowns from 1996-2012. It is now up to someone else to take the next 
step and dig deeper. It should be further noted that researchers should look for more than 
just associations, and try and find direct correlations in the data. In addition, conducting 
logistic regressions might yield some startling finds. Regardless of what new is found 
there are actions that could be taken today based on the research that could help to 
mitigate lingering doubts as to the state of mind of the president during the approval and 
turndown process with the use of their discretionary FEMA power. 
Recommendations for Action 
 
While gaps exist, studies of this type that examine discretionary powers are 
needed and should be encouraged. While this study did not demonstrate correlation 
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between the party of the president and various other variables, there were some strong 
 
 
statistical associations that have been shown. This does not equate to any unethical 
behavior. This research should compel others to gather more data to determine if there 
was a correlation and should suggest to Congress and other stakeholders that there might 
be alternatives to the current FEMA approval process that are equally efficient and 
potentially remove discretionary choice and the appearance of favoritism. As it still 
stands, even with this studies data, it is unknown if presidents acted with potential bias 
with the use of their discretionary powers for FEMA approvals and turndowns. 
It is important to note that the findings of this research, while interesting, still 
leave many questions unanswered. What is has brought to light is that there remain 
questions as to what association a president’s party has to the approval and turndown 
process. There is no greater discretionary power than that of final say, especially in light 
of necessary funds and manpower distribution during a time of a potential crisis. As long 
as discretionary power remains, void of additional research, questions may remain 
unanswered. What factors played a role in the presidential decision making process that 
led to turndowns and approval, and to that end, what weights did each president have, 
internally, on each factor when rendering those final decisions? 
Summary and Implications  for Social Change 
 
While HM demonstrated to be awarded on criteria not related to presidential Party, 
aspects of IA beg the question as to what association being a Democratic governor and 
requesting this type of aid had in the studied time period. Neither HM nor IA added to the 
ability to answer the 4 research questions without further data. Yet there is no 
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doubt as to the plausibility of the argument that the proposed theory has on how PA was 
awarded. It was theorized that a president could 
1. Act in a manner that favors self-interest with FEMA dispensation. 
 
2. Allocate resources to favor his collective (party) interests. 
 
3. Be notable during times when his discretionary powers would favor self 
 
(reelection years in election battleground states). 
 
The evidence shows a statistical association between presidential party and PA 
approvals. As the potential to favor self and party grew (political economy) from non- 
election, to election, to reelection years so too did both presidential Parties increase their 
PA approval percentages (see Table 17) within their same party. At the same time to their 
outgroup, or opposing party, there appeared to exist an inverse association to PA approvals 
and a noted percent increase in Turndowns during the same time frame. 
What is most telling is that this study leaves with more questions than answers. 
What set out to be a study into if presidents acted in a potentially biased manner with the 
use of FEMA approvals during election years in election battleground states and/or if 
there was ingroup favoritism from 1996-2012 within those same states and times, turned 
out to be a series of tests for associations between presidential party and other variables 
and the associated findings with no clear ability to answer the question. It is encouraging 
to note that this research warrants further examination. Whether it is I, or future 
researchers, there now is a beginning framework in which to test future questions about 
presidential discretionary powers. In addition, the identified gaps in this research will 
allow future researchers to more easily build a solid foundation to their own studies 
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Appendix B: A Priori G* Power Tests 
 
F tests - Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, R² increase 
 
Analysis: A priori: Compute required sample size 
 
Input: Effect size f² = 0.15 
α err prob = 0.05 
Power (1-β err prob) = 0.95 
 
Number of tested predictors = 2 
 
Total number of predictors = 2 
 
Output: Noncentrality parameter λ = 16.0500000 
 
Critical F = 3.0837059 
 
Numerator df = 2 
 
Denominator df = 104 
 
Total sample size = 107 
 
Actual power = 0.9518556 
 
 
F tests - Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, R² increase 
 
Analysis: A priori: Compute required sample size 
 
Input: Effect size f² = 0.02 
α err prob = 0.05 
Power (1-β err prob) = 0.95 
 
Number of tested predictors = 2 
 
Total number of predictors = 2 
 
Output: Noncentrality parameter λ = 15.5200000 
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Critical F = 3.0073722 
 
Numerator df = 2 
 
Denominator df = 773 
 
Total sample size = 776 
 
Actual power = 0.9502132 
 
F tests - Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, R² increase 
Analysis:   A priori: Compute required sample size 
Input: Effect size f² =  0.06 
α err prob =  0.05 
Power (1-β err prob) =  0.95 
Number of tested predictors  =  2 
Total number of predictors =  2 
Output: Noncentrality parameter λ =  15.6600000 
Critical F =  3.0307877 
Numerator df =  2 
Denominator df =  258 
Total sample size =  261 
Actual power =  0.9504517 
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